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WHO OWNS HUMAN CAPITAL? 
LILY KAHNG
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the tax law’s capital income preference through 
the lens of intellectual capital, an increasingly important driver of 
economic productivity whose value derives primarily from workers’ 
knowledge, experience and skills. The Article discusses how business 
owners increasingly are able to “propertize” labor into intellectual 
capital—to capture the returns on their workers’ labor by embedding it in 
intellectual property and to restrict workers’ ability to employ their skills 
and knowledge elsewhere. The Article then shows how the tax law 
provides significant subsidies to the process of propertization and thereby 
contributes to the inequitable distribution of returns between business 
owners and workers. The Article’s analysis further reveals the tax law’s 
fundamental capital-labor distinction to be questionable, perhaps even 
illusory, an insight which has profound implications for the tax law. 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. income tax makes a fundamental distinction between income 
from labor and income from capital, upon which substantially different tax 
treatment depends. Originally, the income tax targeted wealthy capital 
owners, and most wage earners were exempt from it.
1
 However, the advent 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Seattle University Law School. For their helpful comments, I am grateful 
to Steven Arkin, Paul Caron, Catherine Connell, Mary Louise Fellows, Ronald Krotoszynski, Leandra 
Lederman, Katherine Pratt, James Puckett, Chris Sanchirico, Dan Shaviro, Andrew Siegel, Gregory 
Silverman, Linda Sugin, and the participants of the 2015 AALS Annual Tax Section Meeting, the 
Emory Law School Faculty Colloquium, the NYU Law School Tax Policy and Public Finance 
Colloquium, the Pepperdine Law School Tax Policy Workshop, the University of Indiana Maurer 
School of Law Tax Policy Colloquium, and the University of Washington Tax Symposium. I thank 
Catherine Connell (J.D. 2016) and Seattle University law librarian Kelly Kunsch for their invaluable 
research assistance.  
 1. See JOHN WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 77 
(1985). Income from labor was thought to be morally superior to income from capital because it 
embodied the Protestant work ethic and the democratic ideal of meritocracy. See Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. 
L.J. 119, 128–29 (1994). Moreover, as John Stuart Mill argued, those who work for a living have less 
ability to pay taxes than those who live off accumulated capital because they have only a finite period 
of time in which they can work and must save for retirement and illness. See 2 JOHN STUART MILL, 
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 315 (1899). 
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of World War II shifted its impact to labor income, transforming it from a 
tax on the rich to a tax on working people, from “class tax to mass tax.”2 
Today, we tax capital income preferentially in a variety of ways, most 
prominently through a reduced rate of tax on capital gains and dividends.
3
 
The preference for capital income has been the subject of intense study 
and debate for many years.
4
 For the past couple of decades, efficiency-
based arguments in favor of a capital income preference have dominated 
 
 
 2. Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the 
Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1989); see also Lily Kahng, Investment 
Income Withholding in the United States and Germany, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 315, 316–20 (2010) 
(describing the expansion of the income tax). See generally Ajay K. Mehrotra & Julia C. Ott, The 
Curious Beginnings of the Capital Gains Tax Preference, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517 (2016) 
(describing the development of the capital gains preference). 
 3. The maximum capital gains rate is twenty percent; the maximum rate on ordinary income is 
39.6 percent. I.R.C. § 1 (2012). These maximum rates do not include Affordable Care Act surtaxes. 
The capital gains rate is applicable to long-term capital gains and dividends. Other forms of income 
from capital, such as interest, rents and royalties, are subject to tax at ordinary income rates.  
 Income from capital is treated favorably in a variety of other ways. Notably, only labor income, 
and not capital income, is subject to additional social security and retirement taxes, collectively known 
as payroll taxes. During the last thirty years, payroll taxes have accounted for one-third or more of 
annual total tax revenues. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES: TABLE 2.2 – 
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF RECEIPTS BY SOURCE: 1934–2001 (last visited Mar. 20, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse. gov/omb/budget/Historicals. See generally Patricia E. Dilley, Breaking the 
Glass Slipper—Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax, 54 TAX LAW. 65 (2000) (analyzing self-
employment taxes); Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of the Federal Income and Payroll 
Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2002) (arguing for the integration of income and payroll 
taxes); Linda Sugin, Payroll Taxes, Mythology, and Fairness, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 113 (2014) 
(arguing that payroll taxes unfairly burden labor income relative to investment income. 
 Furthermore, capital owners can defer gains until realization or avoid taxation entirely through 
basis step up at death. I.R.C. § 1014. Edward McCaffery formulated a memorable summary of all a 
taxpayer needs to do to avoid income and estate tax on financial capital: “Buy, Borrow, Die.” Edward 
J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 890 (2005). See generally 
William J. Turnier, Theory Meets Reality: The Case of the Double Tax on Material Capital, 27 VA. 
TAX REV. 83 (2007) (detailing comprehensively ways in which income from capital and income from 
labor are treated differently).  
 Capital income is not always treated more favorably than labor income. It is easy to come up with 
examples to the contrary. Thus, for example, dividend income is nominally taxed twice under our 
classical system of corporate taxation, first at the corporate level when earned, and then at the 
shareholder level when distributed. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political 
Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325 (1995); Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the 
Double Taxation of Corporate Income, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2003). An example of a labor 
income preference is the earned income tax credit, which results in a negative tax rate for low income 
taxpayers. See generally Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995). On balance, however, the tax law treats capital 
income more favorably than labor income. See John Buckley, Tax Changes Since Woodworth’s Time: 
Implications for Future Tax Reform, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2008); Turnier, supra, at 125. 
 4. See, e.g., Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains 
Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319 (1993); Daniel Halperin, Commentary, A Capital Gains Preference is 
not EVEN a Second-Best Solution, 48 TAX L. REV. 381 (1993); Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary, 
Uneasiness and Capital Gains, 48 TAX L. REV. 393 (1993).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/6
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the debate.
5
 In recent years, however, concerns about rapidly growing 
economic inequality have refocused attention on equity considerations and 
raised serious questions about the validity of efficiency-based arguments 
in favor of the capital income preference. Thomas Piketty’s book, Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century,
6
 is perhaps the most well-known work to 
analyze the widening economic gulf between capital owners and workers, 
and it has galvanized other scholars to address this urgent problem.
7
 
Piketty’s central thesis is that the return on capital tends to exceed 
significantly the growth rate of the economy, which leads to increasing 
concentrations of wealth in the hands of the few and extreme inequality.
8
 
This Article undertakes an equity-based analysis of the tax law’s 
capital-labor distinction from a new perspective. It looks beyond explicit 
tax preferences for income from capital such as the capital gains rate and 
examines less transparent but equally significant ways in which the law 
undertaxes capital owners and overtaxes workers, thereby contributing to 
the growing inequality between capital owners and workers.
9
 
 
 
 5. For example, Edward Kleinbard’s proposal for a dual income tax system is based on the 
premise that capital is more mobile than labor, and that it is therefore efficient to tax capital at lower 
rates than labor. See Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 NW. 
J. L. & SOC. POL'Y. 41, 45–47 (2010); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, And Yet It Moves: Taxation and 
Labor Mobility in the Twenty-First Century, 67 TAX L. REV. 169 (2014). 
 More recently, much of the debate about capital income preferences has focused on whether a 
consumption tax, which completely exempts capital from tax, would be superior to an income tax, a 
question which is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is 
the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 
TAX L. REV. 377 (1992); Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal 
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond 
the Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REV. 745 (2007); Chris William Sanchirico, A 
Critical Look at the Economic Argument for Taxing Only Labor Income, 63 TAX L. REV. 867 (2010). 
 6. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). 
 7. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & Daniel Shaviro, Piketty in America: A Tale of Two Literatures, 
68 TAX L. REV. 453 (2015); Paul L. Caron, Thomas Piketty and Inequality: Legal Causes and Tax 
Solutions, 64 EMORY L. J. ONLINE 2073 (2015); James M. Puckett, Wealth Inequality and Progressive 
Taxation (Mar. 20, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Nelson D. Schwartz, 
Economists Take Aim at Inequality, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/201 
6/01/04/business/economy/economists-take-aim-atwealthinequality.html.  
 8. See PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 26–27, 77. 
 9. The Article takes as its starting point the growing inequality between capital owners and 
workers, but acknowledges that neither workers nor capital owners are a monolithic group. There are 
wide variations within each as to their socioeconomic standing. Capital owners range from a person 
with $200 in a savings account to Warren Buffett. Workers range from the low-wage and unskilled to 
highly compensated executives. The Article focuses on inequality between capital owners and 
workers, which Piketty estimates to account for about one-third of the increase in total income 
inequality since 1980. See PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 300. The Article does not specifically address the 
growing inequality among workers that is particularly pronounced in the United States. See id., at 298–
300, 315–21 (describing how the increase in inequality in the U.S. since the 1970 is due in large part to 
wage inequality). However, the Article does have some bearing on wage inequality as well, to the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Article begins with an exploration of intellectual capital, a growing 
form of capital that includes not only legally protected intangible assets, 
such as patents and copyrights, but also other sources of value such as 
goodwill and organizational processes and know-how. The creation of 
intellectual capital enables capital owners to “propertize” labor: through 
the use of intellectual property laws, contract and employment laws, and 
other legal and organizational mechanisms, capital owners are able to 
capture the returns from their workers’ economic productivity. The Article 
discusses how the legal landscape is rapidly evolving to facilitate and 
expand the propertization of labor.  
The Article then turns to the ways in which the tax law subsidizes the 
process of propertization. Specifically, the tax law allows capital owners 
to immediately deduct most costs of creating intellectual capital, which 
has the effect of exempting from tax their income from intellectual capital. 
Furthermore, the tax law is overly generous to capital owners with respect 
to their investments in human capital, while, at the same time, it denies 
workers recognition of similar investments.
10
 In these ways, the tax 
exacerbates the widening wealth and income gap between capital owners 
and workers.  
The Article concludes with reflections about the porous and changeable 
boundary between labor and capital. It questions whether the tax law 
distinction between labor income and capital income is useful or even 
meaningful. The Article posits that the tax law should not treat labor 
income and capital income as distinct categories, but rather, should 
recognize that workers and capital owners contribute to and share in the 
returns from their collaborative efforts. The Article concludes with an 
overview of specific reform proposals that would implement this 
reconceptualization of workers and capital owners.  
 
 
extent that very highly compensated workers tend to receive a substantial portion of their pay in forms 
that they are able to treat as capital gains. See infra Part III.  
 10. Human capital is closely related to intellectual capital but not coterminous. Intellectual 
capital focuses on businesses’ investment in and production of intangible sources of future value, 
which often require a high proportion of labor inputs. Human capital focuses on an individual’s 
capabilities to produce future value. Capital owners make human capital investments in their workers, 
and workers also make human capital investments in themselves. See infra notes 136–139 and 
accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/6
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I. INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND THE PROPERTIZATION OF LABOR 
A. The Rise of Intellectual Capital 
Capital encompasses forms of wealth including “land, buildings, 
machinery, firms, stocks, bonds, patents, livestock, gold, natural resources, 
etc.”11 The definition includes physical capital, such as land, buildings, 
and other material goods.
12
 It also includes intangible assets such as 
patents or copyrights and financial assets such as bank accounts, corporate 
stock, and pension funds.
13
 
The composition of capital has changed significantly over the last 
several centuries. Agricultural land, which three centuries ago, accounted 
for more than one-half of total capital, comprises only a minimal fraction 
of total capital today, and has been supplanted by industrial and financial 
capital.
14
  
Of these new types of capital, financial capital, and in particular 
corporate stock, is comprised of the underlying assets owned by 
corporations. As Piketty observes, much of the value of corporate stock is 
attributable to what he calls immaterial capital: 
[M]any forms of immaterial capital are taken into account by way 
of the stock market capitalization of corporations. For instance, the 
stock market value of a company often depends on its reputation 
and trademarks, its information systems and modes of organization, 
its investments, whether material or immaterial, for the purpose of 
making its products and services more visible and attractive . . . .
15
  
 
 
 11. PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 113. Some commentators have criticized Piketty’s definition of 
capital and his measurement of it. See, e.g., Matthew Rognlie, Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net 
Capital Share (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, 2015), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
projects/bpea/spring-2015/2015a_rognlie.pdf (observing that most of the increasing returns to capital 
are attributable to the housing sector and that, outside of that sector, the return to capital relative to 
labor is not increasing, contrary to Piketty’s assertion). Other commentators seem to think Piketty’s 
definition of capital is not particularly problematic. See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, Thomas Piketty Is 
Right, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 22, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117429/capital-twenty-first-
century-thomas-piketty-reviewed. 
 12. PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 49. 
 13. Id. at 48–49. 
 14. Id. at 42, 116 fig. 3.1, 117 fig. 3.2, 151. Housing continues to be substantial component of 
today’s capital. See id. at 116 fig 3.1, 117 fig 3.2, 151; ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM 16–22 
(2015) (describing the change in capital from agricultural land to industrial capital and intellectual 
property). 
 15. PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 49. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This Article uses the term “intellectual capital” to refer to these forms of 
immaterial capital. Intellectual capital has been likened to dark matter—
the essential substance that binds together the universe but is not directly 
observable.
16
 It is broadly defined to be “nonphysical sources of value 
(claims to future benefits) generated by innovation (discovery), unique 
organizational designs, or human resource practices.”17 Intellectual capital 
includes not only separable, identifiable, and legally protected assets such 
as patents, trademarks, and copyrights, but also less distinct assets such as 
information systems, administrative structures and processes, market and 
technical knowledge, brands, trade secrets, organizational know-how, 
culture, strategic capabilities, and customer satisfaction.
18
 Examples of this 
broader definition of intellectual capital include Wal-Mart’s computerized 
supply chain, Amazon’s customer service reputation, and Google’s unique 
business model.
19
 
 
 
 16. See Ricardo Hausmann & Federico Sturzenegger, U.S. and Global Imbalances: Can Dark 
Matter Prevent a Big Bang? (Nov. 13, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), www.cid.harvard.edu/ 
cidpublications/darkmatter_051130.pdf (theorizing that the omission of valuable assets such as know-
how, brand recognition, expertise, and research and development skews estimates of trade 
imbalances). Despite the difficulty of precisely defining intellectual capital, the concept is easy to 
grasp intuitively, and its many definitions share core similarities. In their survey of numerous 
definitions of intellectual capital, Leandro Cañibano, Manuel García-Ayuso Covarsí, and M. Paloma 
Sánchez find most definitions agree that intellectual capital refers to “sources of probable future 
economic profits, lacking physical substance, which are controlled by a firm as a result of previous 
events or transactions (self-production, purchase or any other means of acquisition).” LEANDRO 
CAÑIBANO, MANUEL GARCÍA-AYUSO COVARSÍ & M. PALOMA SÁNCHEZ, THE VALUE RELEVANCE 
AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS OF INTANGIBLES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 14 (1999), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/1947974.pdf. 
 17. BARUCH LEV, INTANGIBLES: MANAGEMENT, MEASUREMENT, AND REPORTING 7 (2001). Lev 
cites Merck’s pharmaceutical advances as an example of discovery, Cisco’s internet-based product 
installation and maintenance system as an example of unique organizational design, and Xerox’s 
information-sharing system for employees as an example of human resources. Id. at 6. Lev notes that a 
combination of these sources can produce intellectual capital: the valuable brand Coke combines 
innovation (the secret Coke formula) and organizational structure (exceptional marketing savvy). See 
id. 
 The concept of intellectual capital is not new. As early as the mid-nineteenth century, economists 
recognized that value inheres in more than just tangible assets and that knowledge and innovation are 
essential components of economic activity. See Mie Augier & David J. Teece, An Economics 
Perspective on Intellectual Capital, in PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL 3–4 (Bernard Marr 
ed., 2005); Bernard Marr, The Evolution and Convergence of Intellectual Capital as a Theme, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL, supra, at 213–14; see also Peter Hill, Tangibles, 
Intangibles and Services: A New Taxonomy for the Classification of Output, 32 CANADIAN J. ECON. 
426, 428–37 (1999).  
 18. See Farok J. Contractor, Intangible Assets and Principles for Their Valuation, in VALUATION 
OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS IN GLOBAL OPERATIONS 3, 7 fig. 1.1, 8 (Farok J. Contractor ed., 2001); 
Juergen H. Daum, INTANGIBLE ASSETS AND VALUE CREATION 17 (2003); LEV, supra note 17, at 5–7. 
 19. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NEW SOURCES OF GROWTH: KNOWLEDGE-
BASED CAPITAL—KEY ANALYSES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS—SYNTHESIS REPORT 8, 17 (2013) 
[hereinafter OECD REPORT], https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/knowledge-based-capital-synthesis.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/6
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The growing importance of intellectual capital is indisputable.
20
 
Companies such as Google, Amazon, and Apple exemplify the new 
business model. Their most valuable assets are not property, plant, and 
equipment, but rather operating systems, product designs, organizational 
structures, and their reputation among customers.
21
 Intellectual capital is 
also dominant in more traditional companies. For example, the physical 
assets of Nestlé, the world’s largest food company, comprise only thirteen 
percent of its total value.
22
  
The value of intellectual capital relative to total capital is difficult to 
estimate, in part because its value can be inferred only indirectly from the 
value of the corporations who own much of it, combined with the fact that 
financial and national accounting systems have historically undervalued or 
excluded intellectual capital from measures of economic productivity and 
wealth.
23
 Economists estimate that official measures of gross domestic 
product in recent years omitted as much as one trillion dollars per year of 
investments in intellectual capital.
24
 As Calvin Johnson points out, Google 
and Microsoft’s self-created intangible assets are worth hundreds of 
billions of dollars, as evidenced by their market capitalization, but their 
balance sheets show none of these assets.
25
 Other scholars have observed a 
similar anomaly with respect to pharmaceutical companies: their 
investments in research and development are not recorded as assets on 
their balance sheets, but their market capitalizations clearly demonstrate 
the value of these assets.
26
  
 
 
 20. See generally id. (documenting the global increase in business investment in intellectual 
capital and the resulting increasing productivity gains). 
 21. See id. at 8, 17. Intellectual capital is also dominant in more traditional companies. For 
example, the physical assets of Nestle, the world’s largest food company, comprise only 13% of its 
total value. See id. at 9. 
 22. See id. at 9. 
 23. See Hill, supra note 17, at 436–37, 445; Leonard Nakamura, Intangibles: What Put the New 
in the New Economy?, BUS. REV., July–Aug. 1999, at 3, 4, 6–10.  
 24. See Leonard Nakamura, Investing in Intangibles: Is a Trillion Dollars Missing from GDP?, 
BUS. REV., Q4 2001, at 35–36; Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten, & Daniel Sichel, Measuring Capital 
and Technology: An Expanded Framework, in MEASURING CAPITAL IN THE NEW ECONOMY 11, 12, 30 
(Carol Corrado et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology]. 
 25. See Calvin H. Johnson, Organizational Capital: The Most Important Unsettling Issue in Tax, 
148 TAX NOTES 667, 676 (2015).  
 26. These scholars cite the expensing of self-created R&D to explain why the earnings and assets 
of companies, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers, seem very low relative to their stock prices. They 
argue that the expensing of self-created R&D depresses the earnings of these companies and that the 
failure to capitalize self-created R&D undervalues the assets of these companies. See Nakamura, supra 
note 24, at 30–31; Charles Hulten, Accounting for the Knowledge Economy 7–10 (The Conference Bd. 
Econ. Program Working Paper No. 08-13, 2008), http://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/ 
workingpapers/E-0040-08-WP.pdf; see also William Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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To remedy the failure of most accounting systems to measure 
adequately intellectual capital, Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten, and Daniel 
Sichel developed a framework for quantifying intellectual capital and its 
impact on the national economy.
27
 Their model is the most theoretically 
advanced and comprehensive to date, and according to the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), is widely 
accepted.
28
 Based on this model, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel found that, 
in recent years, intellectual capital accounted for 27 percent of economic 
growth, putting it on par with tangible capital in importance as a source of 
growth.
29
 
In response to the work of economists such as Corrado, Hulten and 
Sichel, government agencies and non-governmental organizations are 
beginning to recognize more fully the role of intellectual capital in 
economic activity. For example, in 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) for the first time included research and development 
(R&D), as well as artistic creations such as films, music, and books, in its 
measures of national economic productivity and wealth, which added $560 
billion to the size of the U.S. economy.
30
 A 2013 report of the OECD 
documented intellectual capital’s ascendance to a global phenomenon and 
urged policy reforms in taxation, innovation, entrepreneurship, education, 
competition, corporate reporting, and intellectual property laws in order to 
realize fully the potential gains of this key economic driver.
31
 The 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IAS) have acknowledged the need to require 
additional qualitative and quantitative disclosure about self-created 
intangible assets.
32
 In sum, intellectual capital is indubitably a major and 
 
 
Rights: Patents and Productive Inefficiency, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2045, 2046–47 (2014) (discussing other 
oddities in the pharmaceutical industry). 
 27. See Carol Corrado, Charles Hulten, & Daniel Sichel, Intangible Capital and U.S. Economic 
Growth, 55 REV. INC. & WEALTH 661, 662, 682 (2009) [hereinafter Corrado et al., Intangible Capital]; 
Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 11, 12, 30. 
 28. See OECD REPORT, supra note 19, at 12. 
 29. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 680. 
 30. See Peter Coy, The Rise of the Intangible Economy: U.S. GDP Counts R&D, Artistic 
Creation, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 18, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/
articles/20130718/the-rise-of-the-intangible-economy-u-dot-s-dot-gdp-counts-r-and-d-artistic-creation. 
The BEA restated GDP for each year retroactive to 1929, the first year of measurement. Id. These 
additions increased the size of the U.S. economy in 2013 by $560 billion, or 3.6 percent. See Jared 
Bernstein & Dean Baker, Op-Ed., What is ‘Seinfeld’ Worth?, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 08/01/opinion/what-is-seinfeld-worth.html. 
 31. See OECD REPORT, supra note 19, at 6–11. 
 32. The FASB and IAS considered a joint project to expand disclosure guidelines for intangibles, 
as part of a broader and ongoing convergence project in 2002. See AM. INST. CERTIFIED PUB. 
ACCOUNTANTS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS 5–6 (2011), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/6
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increasing driver of economic productivity, and its ascendance marks a 
substantial change in the nature and composition of capital. 
B. The Centrality of Labor in Intellectual Capital 
Capital almost always requires labor to be created or enhanced.
33
 This 
is true of traditional forms of capital, such as agriculture and other real 
estate.
34
 Owners of farmland, for example, require workers to cultivate and 
harvest crops and raise livestock in order for the farmland to be 
productive.
35
 Owners of other real estate need workers to build and 
maintain the structures from which owners derive income and gain.
36
 
Capital in the form of natural resources, such as gold or oil, requires 
workers to extract and process them into marketable forms.
37
 Industrial 
capital, such as, for example, a widget factory, needs workers to run, 
operate, and maintain the machinery that produces the widgets.
38
 The 
widget producer also needs workers to develop advertising and marketing 
plans for the widgets.
39
 
Although labor is always integral to the productive use of capital, 
intellectual capital is particularly labor-intensive and often requires 
workers’ knowledge, experience, and skills.40 For example, strategic 
planning requires primarily the time and effort of managers.
41
 Likewise, 
the creation of a consumer products brand results primarily from the work 
effort of design and marketing personnel.
42
 Similarly, scientific R&D 
 
 
http://www.ifrs.com/pdf/IFRSUpdate_V8.pdf. Due to resource constraints, they decided not to move 
forward with it. See Action Alert No. 07-52, FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD. (Dec. 28, 2007), 
http://www.fasb.org/ action/aa122807.shtml. However, more recently, the financial accounting 
community has shown a renewed interest in reforming financial reporting for intangibles. See Emily 
Chasan, FASB’s Future Priorities Start to Take Shape, WALL ST. J.: CFO J. (Sept. 17, 2013, 1:00 
PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ cfo/2013/09/17/fasbs-future-priorities-start-to-take-shape/ (noting that 
accounting for intangible assets is among the top reform priorities). 
 33. See generally PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS (19th ed.) 233–
34 (stating that production is a team effort and that the factors of production, land, labor and capital, 
are interdependent). 
 34. See id.at 267–68. 
 35. See id.at 268. 
 36. See id.at 283. 
 37. See id.at 268. 
 38. See id.at 283. 
 39. See id. 
 40. For this reason, some scholars refer to it as knowledge-based capital. See, e.g., OECD 
REPORT, supra note 19; KARL ERIK SVEIBY, THE NEW ORGANIZATIONAL WEALTH: MANAGING AND 
MEASURING KNOWLEDGE-BASED ASSETS (1997).  
 41. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670; Corrado et al., Measuring 
Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 29. 
 42. See Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 28. 
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requires primarily the time and effort of scientists, although it also requires 
expenditures for labs and equipment.
43
 Not all labor expenditures produce 
intellectual capital.
44
 For example, a fast food server or an office 
receptionist serves the current needs of his or her employer, but the 
services arguably do not provide significant long-term benefits to the 
employer. On the other hand, even these services arguably contribute to 
the creation of a business’ customer service reputation and goodwill.45 
With respect to legally distinct assets such as patents or copyrights, the 
contribution of labor to the creation of intellectual capital becomes 
embedded in the asset, in what Rob Merges calls the “propertization of 
labor.”46 Legally enforceable patent or copyright protections enable the 
owner of the asset (that is, the capital owner) to appropriate and control the 
knowledge contributions of workers.
47
  
Other types of intellectual capital are not distinct, legally protected 
assets. However, businesses often rely upon mechanisms other than 
intellectual property laws to capture and control the labor of their workers. 
Many of these are legal in nature, such as covenants not to compete, 
nondisclosure agreements, and trade secrets laws.
48
 Covenants not to 
compete prohibit workers from employing their training, skill and 
 
 
 43. See id. at 26–27.  
 44. Corrado, Hulten and Sichel estimate, for example, that about sixty percent of advertising 
expenditures produce ads with long-lasting value, as compared to “this week’s sale”-type ads. See 
Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670. 
 45. Chris William Sanchirico, Taxing Carried Interest: The Problematic Analogy to ‘Sweat 
Equity’, 117 TAX NOTES 239, 242 (2007) [hereinafter Sanchirico, Taxing Carried Interest]. 
 46. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 197 (2011); Robert P. Merges, 
Intellectual Property and the Costs of Commercial Exchange: A Review Essay, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1570, 1575 (1995). 
 47. See Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge: Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in 
Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800–1920, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 
445–46 (2001); Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm 
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1149 (2007); 
see also Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundaries of Technology-Intensive 
Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1671–88 (2009) (discussing the organizational effects of patent, 
copyright, trade secret and other legal protections for innovation and information); see generally Dan 
L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at 
the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575 (2007) (analyzing how the strength of intellectual 
property protections affects inter- and intra-firm transactions costs). 
 48. See ORLY LOBEL, TALENT WANTS TO BE FREE 49–75; 98–120 (2013); Orly Lobel, The New 
Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 
790–91 (2015); Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 47, at 1159–63. In addition to legal mechanisms, 
businesses also use “organizational strategies,” as Érica Gorga and Michael Halberstam call them, to 
control knowledge and information. Id. at 1127. For example, a business might restrict critical 
knowledge to a small number of insiders or isolate the business geographically. Id. at 1158–59. 
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experience elsewhere.
49
 Nonsolicitation, nondealing, and nonpoaching 
prohibit an employee, after leaving a company, from soliciting or dealing 
with the company’s clients or customers or from hiring former co-
workers.
50
 Nondisclosure agreements and trade secret laws enable business 
owners to protect valuable organizational capital—for example, 
information relating to suppliers and customers, organizational routines 
and business practices, decision-making processes, quality control 
procedures, coordination and division work.
51
  
In recent decades, there has been a significant expansion of business 
owners’ ability to capture and control workers’ contributions to the 
creation and enhancement of intellectual capital.
52
 This is true for more 
traditional forms of intellectual property such as patents and copyrights. 
Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky describe the trend with respect 
to patent law: 
This trend manifested itself in various aspects of patent law, 
including the broadening of the definition of patentable subject 
matter to include, among others, business-method patents, the 
encouraging of government-subsidized bodies (such as universities) 
to claim patent protection, and the increasing tendency of the legal 
system to uphold patents. As part of this trend, patent law has 
expanded to tolerate even merely embryonic innovation. . . . Patent 
law provides an impressive array of remedies to successful 
plaintiffs, including injunctive relief, actual damages, treble 
 
 
 49. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 47, 1143 tbl. A, 1162 tbl. B; Katherine V.W. Stone, 
Knowledge at Work: Disputes over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 
CONN. L. REV. 721, 738 (2002).  
 50. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 828–31. 
 51. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 47, 1143 tbl. A, 1162 tbl. B; Stone, supra note 49, at 
738. Other legal controls based on breach of duty of loyalty and industrial espionage claims also 
restrain workers from using knowledge or information to benefit a competitor. See Stone, supra note 
49, at 738. 
 52. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 790–91. Intellectual property laws have experienced several 
periods of growth and expansion in the United States. Catherine Fisk, in her analysis of the 
development of the intellectual property laws and the laws governing restrictive covenants from 1800 
to 1920, documents the “gradual shift to recognizing knowledge, especially inchoate knowledge, as a 
form of property, and then recognizing that property as belonging to someone other than the employee 
who possessed it.” See Fisk, supra note 47, at 446. Fisk describes the legal developments during this 
period as reflecting “the growing conflict between the free labor ideology and the demands of 
industrialization which increasingly called for the corporate control of every tangible and intangible 
product of work” which “witnessed in its last days unprecedented formalization of corporate power 
over all aspects of employment and production.” Id. at 535. See generally William W. Fischer, III, The 
Growth of Intellectual Property: A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States, in 
EIGENTUM IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH 265–91 (1999), reprinted in 1 INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 72–94 (David Vaver ed., 2006).  
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damages for willful infringement, and attorneys’ fees in exceptional 
cases.
53
  
In the area of copyright law, Lawrence Lessig describes an even more 
dramatic expansion of business owners’ ability to capture the returns from 
intellectual property: 
So copyright’s duration has increased dramatically—tripled in the 
past thirty years. And copyright’s scope has increased as well—
from regulating only publishers to now regulating just about 
everyone. And copyright’s reach has changed, as every action 
becomes a copy and hence presumptively regulated. And as 
technologists find better ways to control the use of content, and as 
copyright is increasingly enforced through technology, copyright’s 
force changes, too. Misuse is easier to find and easier to control.
54
 
Furthermore, under the work for hire doctrine, an employer is presumed to 
be the author and owner of works created by an employee unless the 
parties agree otherwise.
55
 
The trend toward expansion of business owners’ intellectual property 
rights is equally pronounced with respect to employment law restrictions 
on workers.
56
 The use of covenants not to compete and nondisclosure 
agreements has become widespread.
57
 Courts have expanded the power 
and scope of these restrictive covenants by liberalizing what constitutes 
reasonable temporal and geographic constraints, more freely upholding 
 
 
 53. Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 1672–73 (footnotes omitted). They note that the 
trend may be reversing somewhat in recent years on the basis of recent judicial decisions raising the 
bar of patentability and narrowing the scope of protection. See id. at 1673–75. 
 54. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 161–62 (2004). 
 55. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Creative Employee and the Copyright Act of 1976, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 590, 598–99 (1987). 
 56. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 793–833 (describing the expansion of regulatory and contractual 
controls on human capital, including noncompetition contracts, pre-invention assignment agreements, 
nonsolicitation, nonpoaching, and antidealing agreements, nondisclosure agreements, and trade secret 
laws); Stone, supra note 49, at 737–62 (describing doctrinal expansions in the ability of employers to 
restrain former employees from using knowledge obtained at their firms).  
 57. See Stone, supra note 49, at 738–39; Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete 
Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 425 (2011); Mark J. 
Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm 
Investment, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 378, 396 (2011) (finding that in a randomly selected sample of 
500 Execucomp firms, 70.2 percent report using noncompetition agreements with top executives, 
although the actual percentage is likely higher); Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin, & Randall S. 
Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment 
Covenants, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1, 24, 28 tbl. 2 (2015) (finding that in a randomly selected sample of 
500 S&P 1500 public companies, 82.3 percent of CEO contracts contained restrictive covenants during 
the period 2001–2010). 
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them in the at-will context, and either revising or partially enforcing 
invalid covenants.
58
 In addition, courts have expanded the type of interest 
that is considered protectable by a restrictive covenant to include customer 
lists and knowledge obtained by employer-provided training.
59
  
The law of trade secrets has also expanded significantly in recent years 
to empower business owners to control workers.
60
 The definition of trade 
secret has expanded dramatically to extend trade secret protection beyond 
the technical realm to all commercially valuable information.
61
 It has 
become standard practice for employment contracts to include expansive 
lists of confidential information beyond the statutory definition of trade 
secret.
62
 In addition, even in the absence of a protectable trade secret or a 
restrictive covenant, business owners have the power to restrict workers’ 
use of knowledge under the expanding doctrine of inevitable disclosure, 
which enables a business owner to enjoin a former employee from 
working for a competitor on the grounds that such work would inevitably 
require the disclosure of trade secrets.
63
 Furthermore, trade secret law has 
become increasingly criminalized under the Economic Espionage Act and 
the National Stolen Property Act.
64
  
 
 
 58. See Stone, supra note 49, at 744. See generally Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your 
Employer: Relative Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for Employee 
Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751, 780 (2011) (analyzing the changes in the strength of 
enforceability of covenants not to compete in all states and finding “a measurable drift of the aggregate 
policies in the United States toward greater enforcement”); Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The 
Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy 
Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107, 122–48 (2008) (analyzing enforcement of covenants not to compete 
and finding a general trend in the common law and legislation toward greater restrictions on 
employees). 
 59. See Stone, supra note 49, at 746–56. 
 60. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 803–12. 
 61. See Stone, supra note 49, at 757; see also Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 
1675--78.  
 62. See Lobel, supra note 48, at 810. 
 63. See Stone, supra note 49, at 757–58. See generally David Lincicum, Inevitable Conflict?: 
California’s Policy of Worker Mobility and the Doctrine of “Inevitable Disclosure,” 75 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1257 (2002); Joseph F. Phillips, Inevitable Disclosure Through an Internet Lens: Is the 
Doctrine’s Demise Truly Inevitable?, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395 (2003); Jennifer L. Saulino, 
Locating Inevitable Disclosure’s Place in Trade Secret Analysis, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1184 (2002); 
Brandy L. Treadway, An Overview of Individual States’ Application of Inevitable Disclosure: 
Concrete Doctrine or Equitable Tool?, 55 SMU L. REV. 621 (2002). 
 64.  See Lobel, supra note 48, at 804–12 (describing the prosecution and conviction of computer 
programmer Sergey Aleynikov for stealing source code and computer code from Goldman Sachs). In 
2016, Congress further expanded federal trade secret laws with the enactment of the Defend Trade 
Secrets Act of 2016. Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (2016). 
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To summarize, on numerous fronts, the law has expanded in scope and 
strength to increase the ability of capital owners to propertize labor into 
intellectual capital.
65
 
C. Who Gains from Propertization?  
The enhanced ability of capital owners to propertize labor into 
intellectual capital through the legal mechanisms described above does not 
necessarily mean that they have also increased their share of the returns 
from that intellectual capital. It may be that workers are able to extract 
higher compensation in exchange for transferring their expertise for the 
exclusive benefit of their employer. Most intellectual property and 
corporate law scholars do not address the issue of how returns from 
intellectual capital are shared between capital owners and workers. 
Instead, they analyze intellectual property laws and employment 
restrictions through an efficiency lens that seeks to allocate rights so as to 
optimize overall productivity and maximize positive externalities, such as 
knowledge spillovers and information flows that fuel innovation and 
entrepreneurial growth.
66
 Dan Burk and Brett McDonnell allude to the 
possibility that workers get the short end of the stick in their analysis of 
intellectual property rights: “[I]t is even possible that the law rather 
pervasively and systematically provides too little protection for employees 
vis-à-vis firms. . . . [T]his leaves employees open to exploitation.”67 
Unfortunately, they leave exploration of this possibility to future 
research.
68
 
The tenor of employment law scholars such as Kathy Stone and 
Catherine Fisk suggests they, too, believe workers are on the losing end of 
 
 
 65. There are exceptions to this expansionary trend. For example, in patent law, recent judicial 
decisions have raised the bar of patentability and narrowed the scope of protection. See Bar-Gill & 
Parchomovsky, supra note 47, at 1673–75. 
 66. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not To Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999) 
(hypothesizing that Silicon Valley companies benefit from knowledge spillovers that occur in the 
absence of covenants not to compete); Lobel, supra note 48, at 350 (“[E]xcessive controls over 
mobility and inventiveness are harmful to careers, regions, and innovation. . . . [I]t stymies the entry of 
new competitors into the market and suppresses the spirit of entrepreneurship, which is vital to any 
economy.”); Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing 
Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Investment, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 303–11 (2006) (describing the law and economics approach of 
many scholars in analyzing restrictive covenants).  
 67. Burk & McDonnell, supra note 47, at 634–35. 
 68. See id. at 634. 
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the bargain.
69
 However, they tend to express their normative evaluations in 
terms of workers’ right to be free of unfair employer constraints on their 
ability to work and do not address explicitly how these constraints affect 
the distribution of economic returns between workers and capital owners.
70
 
Norman Bishara notes the dearth of research “focused on the normative 
arguments about the propriety of noncompetes when it comes to workers’ 
rights and issues such as bargaining power asymmetries.”71 
Whether workers receive higher pay in exchange for agreeing to 
employer restrictions is a question that needs much additional research. 
However, one scholar, Mark Garmaise, finds the opposite to be true—
employees are actually paid less when they are subject to employer 
restrictions.
72
 Garmaise analyzes the effects of noncompete covenants on 
executive employment based on state-by-state variances in the strength of 
enforcement, and finds that stronger enforcement of noncompete 
covenants results in lower executive compensation.
73
  
 
 
 69. Stone argues that courts should interpret restrictions on employees narrowly because the 
implicit psychological contract between business owners and workers has changed from a long-term 
relationship, in which a business owner “gave the worker an implicit promise of lifetime job security 
and opportunities for promotion along clearly-defined job ladders,” to a temporary, contingent 
relationship “with no set path, no established expectations, and no tacit promises of job security. 
Employees are expected to chart their own path, face their own fortunes, and manage their own careers 
in a boundaryless workplace.” Stone, supra note 49, at 725, 732. 
 Fisk argues that “[b]y transforming employee knowledge into corporate property, law has 
consecrated a power relationship and has justified rights to control employee mobility in significant 
ways.” See Catherine L. Fisk, Knowledge Work: New Metaphors for the New Economy, 80 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 839, 856 (2005). 
 70. See, e.g., Fisk, supra note 47, at 535 (stating that the nineteenth century development of trade 
secrets and restrictive covenants “reflected the growing conflict between the free labor ideology and 
the demands of industrialization which increasingly called for the corporate control of every tangible 
and intangible product of work”); Stone, supra note 49, at 763 (arguing that courts should narrowly 
construe trade secrets law and restrictive covenants and “thereby give employees broad rights to 
acquire, retain, and deploy their human capital”); see also Bishara, supra note 66, at 311–12 
(describing an employees’ right approach to analyzing restrictive covenants, which “emphasizes the 
sovereignty of the employee and challenges the firm's ability to control the individual's labor post-
employment”); see also Stefan Lücking & Susanne Pernicka, Knowledge Work and Intellectual 
Property Rights: New Challenges for Trade Unions, 14 J. WORKPLACE RTS. 311, 316 (2009) (noting 
that intellectual property rights affect “the balance of power between knowledge workers and their 
employers;” also noting parallels to Marx’s theory of primitive accumulation: “the double process of 
transforming public goods . . . into private property and expropriating workers from their means of 
production). 
 71. Bishara, supra note 58, at 762 n.40. 
 72. Garmaise, supra note 57, at 413 (finding that increased enforcement of noncompetes leads to 
lower executive compensation). 
 73. See id. at 401–02. This finding seems somewhat counterintuitive, but the explanation appears 
to be as follows: executives in states where noncompete covenants are strongly enforced initially 
bargain for higher compensation, perhaps in the form of a signing bonus, but once they are locked into 
a firm, their pay increases diminish over time relative to pay increases for executives in states without 
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Garmaise also considers the effect of noncompete covenants on 
employers’ human capital investments—for instance, employee training or 
the revelation of trade secrets—and employees’ investments in their own 
human capital—for example, networking with managers at other firms or 
taking on leadership positions in industry associations.
74
 He finds that 
noncompete covenants tend to encourage firm investments in managerial 
human capital and discourage individuals’ investments in their own human 
capital.
75
  
What little evidence there is at this point suggests that workers lose out 
when their labor is propertized into intellectual capital. It is also 
reasonable to surmise that business owners benefit from this 
propertization. On the other hand, it is possible that business owners end 
up no better off, or actually end up worse off, because, for example, their 
workers perform less well when their mobility is restricted,
76
 or because 
they lose out on the benefits of information spillovers.
77
 But whether, as a 
result of propertization, the pie is bigger, smaller, or the same size, it 
seems likely that business owners end up with a bigger piece relative to 
the workers.   
II. TAX SUBSIDIES OF PROPERTIZATION 
The rise of a new form of capital—intellectual capital—illustrates how 
labor contributes to the creation or enhancement of capital and becomes 
embedded in capital. The conversion of labor into intellectual capital—its 
 
 
strong enforcement of noncompete covenants. Over time, it appears that pay in the low-enforcement 
states outstrips pay in the high-enforcement states. See id. 
 In addition, Garmaise finds that strong enforcement of noncompete covenants also leads to more 
salary-based, as opposed to incentive-based, compensation and lower pay increases for executives who 
change jobs. See id. at 402–07. He also finds that strong enforcement leads to longer job tenure and 
reduced mobility. See id. at 400, 413. 
 74. See id. at 382–83. 
 75. See id. at 413–14; On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of 
Noncompete Law, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 833, 846 (2013) (observing that covenants not to compete 
cause employees to perform less well and invest less in their own human capital).   
 76. See Amir & Lobel, supra note 75, at 863 (finding that individuals’ quality of work declined 
when they were subject to restrictions their mobility). 
 77. See Garmaise, supra note 57, at 411–12 (finding that enforcement of covenants to compete 
has no significant effect on firm value or profitability and theorizing that “the positive spillovers from 
low enforceability may roughly balance out the disadvantages at the individual firm level”); Samila & 
Sorenson, supra note 57, at 436 (finding that noncompete covenants limit entrepreneurship and impede 
innovation); Kenneth A. Younge, Employee Mobility and the Appropriation of Value from 
Knowledge: Evidence from Three Essays 8 (2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Colorado), http://gradworks.umi.com/35/27/3527377.html (finding that constraints on employee 
mobility initially boost firm value but that the effect is eventually undone because firms are harmed by 
the slower circulation of talent and ideas). 
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propertization—enables capital owners to capture a greater share of the 
economic gains derived from the combined efforts of labor and capital. 
This section shows how the tax law subsidizes propertization and thereby 
magnifies the distributional effects of propertization as between capital 
owners and workers.  
A.  Deductions for Intellectual Capital 
Capital owners have two ways to acquire ownership of intellectual 
capital. First, they can acquire it from third parties by purchasing a specific 
asset such as a patent or by purchasing an ongoing business, thereby 
acquiring intellectual capital such as good will, workforce in place, and 
other types of organizational capital. The second way that capital owners 
acquire intellectual capital is to create it themselves. Self-created 
intellectual capital entails a variety of expenditures including computer 
software development; scientific R&D; nonscientific R&D such as 
development and design of products by the publishing, entertainment, and 
financial services industries; advertising and market research used to 
develop and maintain brands; workforce training and education; and 
organizational strategic planning.
78
  
 
 
 78. This list of intellectual capital expenditures is based on Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel’s 
taxonomy of the various types of investments in intellectual capital. They identify three major areas of 
business investment in intellectual capital: (1) computerized information software, (2) innovative 
property (scientific and nonscientific research and development), and (3) economic competencies 
(brand-related investment such as advertising and organizational investments such as training and 
strategic planning). See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 669–70; Corrado et al., 
Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 22–29. 
 Of particular note is the expansive R&D category, which includes nonscientific R&D—the 
development and design of products by the publishing, entertainment, and financial services 
industries—as well as scientific R&D, which includes work in the physical sciences, the biological 
sciences, and mineral exploration. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670, 674; 
Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 24–28. Corrado, Hulten, and 
Sichel estimate that by the late 1990s, nonscientific R&D was at least as large as traditional scientific 
research. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670; Corrado et al., Measuring 
Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 26. 
 Also noteworthy is their expansive economic competencies category, which includes advertising 
and market research used to develop and maintain brands, costs of developing and launching new 
products and developing customer lists, workforce training and education, and organizational change 
and development. See Corrado et al., Measuring Capital and Technology, supra note 24, at 28–29; see 
also Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 670. They estimate that from 2000 to 2003, 
the most recent period for which they have data, total investment in economic competencies was 
nearly as large as the other two major categories combined. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, 
supra note 27, at 670. 
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Under the principle of capitalization, the foundational importance of 
which the Supreme Court has affirmed in its jurisprudence,
79
 capital 
owners ought to capitalize expenditures they incur to acquire or create 
intellectual capital. As the following discussion indicates, the treatment of 
intellectual capital acquired from third parties is consistent with this 
principle: capital owners must capitalize the acquisition costs. In contrast, 
the treatment of self-created intellectual capital contravenes the 
capitalization principle: capital owners can deduct almost all costs of self-
created intellectual capital.
80
 
 
 
 79. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992); Comm’r v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 
1 (1974). See also infra notes 82–98 and accompanying text. 
 80. See generally Lily Kahng, The Taxation of Intellectual Capital, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2229 (2014). 
Several tax scholars have analyzed and critiqued the taxation of intangibles, most notably Calvin 
Johnson. See Calvin H. Johnson, First Do No Harm: The Senate Staff Discussion Draft on Cost 
Recovery, 142 TAX NOTES 549 (2014) [hereinafter Johnson, First Do No Harm], http://www.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2394912; Calvin H. Johnson, Extend the Tax Life for Acquired Intangibles to 75 Years, 135 
TAX NOTES 1053, 1053–56 (2012), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract= 2070101; Calvin H. Johnson, 
Accurate and Honest Tax Accounting for Oil and Gas, 125 TAX NOTES 573 (2009), 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1503574 (discussing the taxation of intangible drilling costs); Calvin H. 
Johnson, Capitalize Costs of Software Development, 124 TAX NOTES 603 (2009), 
http://www.ssrn.com/ abstract=1516809; Calvin H. Johnson, The Effective Tax Ratio and the 
Undertaxation of Intangibles, 121 TAX NOTES 1289 (2008) [hereinafter Johnson, Undertaxation of 
Intangibles], http://www.ssrn.com/ abstract=1315477; Calvin H. Johnson, Destroying Tax Base: The 
Proposed INDOPCO Capitalization Regulations, 99 TAX NOTES 1381 (2003) [hereinafter Johnson, 
Destroying Tax Base], http://www.ssrn.com/ abstract=412728; Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalization After 
the Government’s Big Win in INDOPCO, 63 TAX NOTES 1323 (1994) [hereinafter Johnson, Big Win], 
https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/calvinjohnson/capitalization_after_the_governments_big_win.pdf; Calvin 
H. Johnson, The Expenditures Incurred by the Target Corporation in an Acquisitive Reorganization 
Are Dividends to the Shareholders: (Pssst, Don’t Tell the Supreme Court), 53 TAX NOTES 463, 478 
(1991) [hereinafter Johnson, Dividends], https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/calvinjohnson/expenditures_ 
incurred_by_the_target_corp_10_28_91.pdf; see also Don Fullerton & Andrew B. Lyon, Tax 
Neutrality and Intangible Capital, in 2 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 63 (Lawrence H. Summers 
ed., 1988); Jane G. Gravelle & Jack Taylor, Tax Neutrality and the Tax Treatment of Purchased 
Intangibles, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 77 (1992); John W. Lee, Transaction Costs Relating to Acquisition or 
Enhancement of Intangible Property: A Populist, Political, but Practical Perspective, 22 VA. TAX 
REV. 273, 276–77, 311–20 (2002) [hereinafter Lee, Transaction Costs]; John Lee et al., Restating 
Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for “Rough Justice” Regulations (Part One), 23 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 631 (1997) [hereinafter Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part One)]; John Lee et al., Restating 
Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for “Rough Justice” Regulations (Part Two), 23 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 1483 (1997) [hereinafter Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part Two)]; George Mundstock, 
Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179 (1987); Xuan-Thao Nguyen & 
Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1 
(2010); David A. Weisbach, Measurement and Tax Depreciation Policy: The Case of Short-Term 
Intangibles, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2004); Ethan Yale, The Final INDOPCO Regulations, 105 TAX 
NOTES 435 (2004) [hereinafter Yale, INDOPCO Regulations]; Ethan Yale, When Are Capitalization 
Exceptions Justified?, 57 TAX L. REV. 549 (2004) [hereinafter Yale, Capitalization Exceptions]; 
Timothy E. Johns, Note, Tax Treatment of the Costs of Internally Developed Intangible Assets, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 767 (1984); Glenn Walberg, Note, Everything Old Is New Again: Reaching the Limits of 
INDOPCO’s Future Benefits with the Just-in-Time Management Philosophy, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1257 (1997). 
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1. In Principle: The “Norm of Capitalization”81 
Tax law generally provides for the deduction or capitalization of 
business expenditures. I.R.C. § 162 allows businesses to deduct “all the 
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year 
in carrying on any trade or business.”
82
 I.R.C. § 263 provides that 
businesses cannot deduct capital expenditures—“amount[s] paid out for 
new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to 
increase the value of any property or estate.”
83
  
As the Supreme Court explained in INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 
capitalization “endeavors to match expenses with the revenues of the 
taxable period to which they are properly attributable, thereby resulting in 
a more accurate calculation of net income for tax purposes.”84 The idea 
that businesses should capitalize expenditures that produce future benefits 
is integral to the concept of income,
85
 and tax law has required 
capitalization since its inception.
86
  
The Court has interpreted the capitalization requirement of I.R.C. § 263 
expansively, stating that “deductions are exceptions to the norm of 
capitalization”87 and are guided by the principle that “a taxpayer’s 
realization of benefits beyond the year in which the expenditure is incurred 
is undeniably important in determining whether the appropriate tax 
treatment is immediate deduction or capitalization.”88  
 
 
 81. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84. 
 82. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2012). 
 83. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1). 
 84.  INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84.  
 85. As Calvin Johnson states: 
A strong law of capitalization is extraordinarily important to an income tax. Under the norms 
of an income tax, costs that constitute investments, generating future income for the taxpayer, 
are capitalized and may not be deducted so long as the costs continue to generate 
income. . . . The thesis that expensing an investment, that is, deducting it immediately, is 
equivalent to exempting the subsequent income from the investment from tax, is one of the 
bulwarks of modern tax economics, but it is not generally known or appreciated within the tax 
law community. 
Johnson, Dividends, supra note 80, at 478. For a comprehensive overview of capitalization in general, 
see Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part One), supra note 80; see also Lee et al., Rough Justice (Part Two), 
supra note 80. 
 86. Woodward v. Comm’r, 397 U.S. 572, 574–75 (1970). 
 87. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 84. 
 88. Id. at 87. See generally Lee, Transaction Costs, supra note 80, at 311–19 (analyzing Supreme 
Court capitalization jurisprudence). As an example of the Court’s expansive interpretation of the 
capitalization principle, it has in several cases required capitalization of expenses such as legal fees 
that might be viewed as quintessentially deductible expenses. See, e.g., INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 88–90 
(holding that investment banking, legal, and accounting fees paid in connection with the taxpayer’s 
being acquired by another company were capital; creation or enhancement of a separate and distinct 
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With respect to tangible property, the Court’s expansive view of 
capitalization reached its zenith in Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.,
89
 
where the Court held that depreciation allowances for equipment used to 
construct new facilities were not deductible, but rather must be 
capitalized—that is, added to the basis of the new facilities.90 Congress 
subsequently enacted I.R.C. § 263A, a far-reaching extension of Idaho 
Power that requires businesses to capitalize the direct and indirect costs of 
constructing or producing tangible property.
91
 
With respect to intangible property (which the tax law defines in a 
manner similar to intellectual capital as defined in this Article), the Court, 
in INDOPCO, further expanded its sweeping capitalization principle. In 
INDOPCO, the taxpayer, the National Starch Corporation, paid investment 
banking, legal, and accounting fees in connection with a merger in which 
Unilever acquired the stock of National Starch.
92
 National Starch claimed 
the majority of these expenses as deductions under I.R.C. § 162; the 
government argued that the expenses were capital in nature.
 93
  
Rejecting the taxpayer’s argument that a capital expenditure must 
relate to the acquisition or enhancement of a “separate and distinct asset,” 
the Court found that National Starch’s expenses were capital, even though 
National Starch was the target of a takeover by Unilever, and, therefore, 
had not acquired anything.
94
 The Court reasoned that by becoming a 
subsidiary of Unilever, National Starch would realize long-term benefits in 
the form of synergies with Unilever product lines and customer bases, 
access to Unilever’s R&D resources, and the elimination of separate 
 
 
asset was not necessary); Comm’r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 403 U.S. 345, 347–49, 354 (1971) 
(concluding that mandatory premium payments made by bank to Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation were capital, and created or enhanced a “separate and distinct additional asset” (i.e., rights 
in a secondary reserve fund), and were therefore, not ordinary); Woodward, 397 U.S. at 573–74, 579 
(holding that legal, accounting, and appraisal expenses incurred in acquiring minority stock interest 
were capital); United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580, 582–83, 585 (1970) (holding that 
legal, consulting, and other fees paid by acquiring firm in connection with minority appraisal rights 
were capital).  
 89. 418 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 90. See id. at 19. 
 91. See I.R.C. § 263A (2012); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263(a)-1–(a)-6 (2013). Due to a 
definitional divergence between “intangibles” and “intellectual capital” for tax purposes, certain types 
of intellectual capital are also subject to § 263A of the Internal Revenue Code. See infra notes 101–
102, 109 and accompanying text. 
 92. INDOPCO, 503 U.S. at 80–82. 
 93. See id. at 82. 
 94. See id. at 85–87 (internal quotations omitted). National Starch was the target of the 
acquisition and therefore did not itself acquire any asset. See id. at 80. The taxpayer’s argument was 
based on the Court’s prior decision in Comm’r v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n. See id. at 86. 
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reporting requirements and governance procedures.
95
 In light of these 
long-term benefits, the Court held that National Starch’s expenditures to 
facilitate the acquisition were capital.
96
 
INDOPCO established a strong capitalization principle for 
expenditures related to a broad conception of intellectual capital including 
brand and customer enhancement, research capabilities, and corporate 
organization.
97
 Indeed, in the aftermath of INDOPCO, many scholars and 
practitioners speculated that INDOPCO would vastly expand the 
capitalization requirement.
98
 However, as discussed in the next Section, 
the speculation proved unfounded. On the contrary, the capitalization 
requirement has been nearly eliminated for self-created intellectual capital. 
2. In Practice: “Deductibility as the Default Rule”99 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court in INDOPCO articulated a 
sweeping capitalization principle which requires most expenditures related 
to intellectual capital to be capitalized rather than immediately deducted. 
Consistent with INDOPCO, current law generally requires capitalization 
with respect to acquired intellectual capital. However, the current law’s 
treatment of self-created intellectual capital defies INDOPCO and instead 
allows most expenditures for self-created intellectual capital to be 
deducted immediately.
100
 
 
 
 95. Id. at 88–89. 
 96. Id. at 89–90. INDOPCO raised taxpayer concerns about the possibility of a greatly expanded 
capitalization requirement, but these have proved to be unfounded. See Joseph Bankman, The Story of 
INDOPCO: What Went Wrong in the Capitalization v. Deduction Debate?, in TAX STORIES, 238–45 
(Paul L. Caron ed., 2d ed. 2009). Subsequent case law and regulatory guidance adopt a considerably 
diminished capitalization requirement. See infra notes 108–123 and accompanying text; Bankman, 
supra, at 240–45. 
 97. This broad conception of intellectual capital tracks closely with Corrado, Hulten, and 
Sichel’s expansive taxonomy of intellectual capital investments. See supra note 78. The Court in effect 
held that National Starch’s expenditures related to it being acquired by Unilever were capital 
enhancements to National Starch’s goodwill. See Johnson, Dividends, supra note 80, at 466–67, 476. 
 98. See, e.g., Johnson, Big Win, supra note 80, at 1332–38 (predicting capitalization of a variety 
of other previously deductible expenses including prepaid fees, business expansion costs, 
environmental cleanup costs, and remedial costs). Johnson is one of the few who wrote approvingly of 
INDOPCO’s expansive view of capitalization. See, e.g., id. at 1340–41. Many practitioners and 
lobbyists were highly critical of it. See Bankman, supra note 96, at 238–40 (describing the negative 
reactions to the decision). 
 99. James L. Atkinson, The Final INDOPCO Regulations: A Primer, 56 TAX EXECUTIVE 222, 
224 (2004). 
 100. See Bankman, supra note 96, at 240–250 (describing subsequent judicial decisions on 
capitalization and the administrative response and concluding that the INDOPCO decision was a 
failure); Lee, Transaction Costs, supra note 80 (describing the audit and litigation challenges faced by 
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in attempting to implement a broad capitalization principle, the 
congressional and judicial resistance to such efforts, and the IRS’s retreat). 
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a. Acquired Intellectual Capital
101
 
Where a business acquires intangible assets, as defined in I.R.C. 
§ 197,
102
 from a third party as part of a taxable acquisition of a larger 
business,
103
 the purchaser capitalizes and amortizes most of those 
intangible assets ratably over fifteen years.
104
 Where intangible assets are 
purchased separately and not as part of a larger business, their treatment is 
quite varied. Some of them, such as customer lists, are subject to the 
fifteen-year amortization rule of I.R.C. § 197.
105
 Others, such as patents 
and copyrights, are excluded from the fifteen-year amortization rule and 
instead are treated under other applicable tax laws.
106
 For example, the 
 
 
 101. Tax law does not use the term “intellectual capital.” Rather, it uses “intangibles” and 
“intangible assets,” as defined in a variety of statutory provisions and regulations. See, e.g. I.R.C. 
§ 197 (2012). There is a fair amount of overlap between these tax terms and intellectual capital as 
defined in this Article. The following discussion generally uses the tax terms “intangibles” and 
“intangible assets” interchangeably with the term “intellectual capital” and notes where the two terms 
diverge. 
 102. The definition of intangibles under I.R.C. § 197 includes (but is not limited to): goodwill; 
going concern value; workforce in place; business books and records; operating systems or other 
information bases including customer lists; patents; copyrights; formulas; processes; designs; 
knowhow; customer-based intangibles; supplier-based intangibles; licenses; permits; other rights 
granted by a governmental unit; covenants not compete; franchises; trademarks; and trade names. 
I.R.C. § 197(d)(1). Certain intangibles such as computer software, oil and gas exploration, and 
financial intangibles are excluded from the general treatment of intangibles under I.R.C. § 197, but 
they are still considered intangibles for other tax purposes. See id. § 197(e). 
 103. In general, an acquisition is taxable when cash or other property is the sole or primary 
consideration for the acquisition; an acquisition is tax-free when equity of the acquiring party is the 
sole or primary consideration for the acquisition. See I.R.C. §§ 354, 368; Michael L. Schler, Basic Tax 
Issues in Acquisition Transactions, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 879, 882 (2012). I.R.C. § 197 applies to 
taxable acquisitions (i.e., purchases) but not to tax-free acquisitions. See Jack S. Levin & Donald E. 
Rocap, A Transactional Guide to New Code Section 197, TAX NOTES 462 (Oct. 25, 1993), 
https://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2582/Document1/Transactional%20Guide%2
0to%20New%20Code%20Section%20197.pdf. Where intangible assets are acquired in a tax-free 
acquisition, the acquiring party generally “stands in the shoes” of the selling party to determine 
treatment of the intangibles. See I.R.C. § 197(f)(2); MARK J. SILVERMAN, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, 
PURCHASE PRICE ALLOCATION RULES: SECTIONS 1060, 338, and 197, 55 (2013), 
http://www.steptoe.com/publications-1630.html.  
 104. See I.R.C. §§ 197, 338, 1060. See generally MARTIN D. GINSBURG ET AL., MERGERS, 
ACQUISITIONS AND BUYOUTS ¶¶ 403.4.1.1–403.4.2 (2012); Levin & Rocap, supra note 103, at 461–
62; Schler, supra note 103, at 887, 896; SILVERMAN, supra note 103, at 41–43, 45–52. 
 Certain intangible assets are eligible for amortization over shorter time periods or outright 
deduction. See Levin & Rocap, supra note 103, at 463–66. For example, taxpayers amortize off-the-
shelf computer software purchased as part of a business over three years rather than fifteen. See I.R.C. 
§§ 167(f), 197(e)(3). Taxpayers may deduct the cost of a franchise, trademark, or trade name where 
the purchase price is contingent on its use or productivity. See id. §§ 197(f)(4)(C), 1253(d)(1).  
 105. See id. § 197(d)(1)(c)(iv); Levin & Rocap, supra note 103, at 466. 
 106. See I.R.C. § 167(g); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-3, (a)-14 (2016); Nguyen & Maine, supra note 
80, at 19–21. 
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acquirer of a patent amortizes its cost over the remaining legal life of the 
patent.
107
  
b. Self-Created Intellectual Capital 
Under Treasury regulations issued in 2004—known as the INDOPCO 
regulations because they address many of the questions and uncertainties 
raised by that case—taxpayers may deduct immediately most investments 
in self-created intellectual capital.
108
 The INDOPCO regulations set forth 
an exclusive list of eight relatively narrow types of intangible assets whose 
development or creation costs businesses must capitalize.
109
 Even though 
other self-created intangibles in theory might be subject to capitalization, 
in practice, the INDOPCO regulations permit taxpayers to deduct all other 
self-created intangibles “without hesitation.”110 One commentator 
characterizes the INDOPCO regulations as a “reversal of the notion that 
‘capitalization is the norm,’ with deductibility—at least in the context of 
created intangibles—now being the default rule.”111 Another has suggested 
 
 
 107. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-14(c). 
 108. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4 (2013). The regulations set forth an exclusive list of eight 
relatively narrow types of intangible assets whose development or creation costs are subject to 
capitalization: (1) financial interests such as stock, debt and other financial instruments, and annuities; 
(2) prepaid expenses such as prepaid insurance or rent; (3) membership or privileges such as a doctor’s 
payment to a hospital for lifetime staff privileges; (4) payments to governments for trademarks, 
copyrights, permits, licenses, and franchises; (5) contract rights to use or be compensated for the use of 
property, covenants not to compete, stand-still agreements, insurance policies, endowments, or 
annuities; (6) contract terminations; (7) amounts paid for real property where the taxpayer transfers 
ownership but retains significant economic benefits; and (8) defense or perfection of title of intangible 
property. See id. § 1.263(a)-4(d); Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 440; Johnson, 
Destroying the Tax Base, supra note 80, at 1382; Atkinson, supra note 99, at 229 (stating that the final 
INDOPCO regulations have made deductibility the norm for self-created intangibles). 
 109. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d), supra note 108 and accompanying text. See also Yale, 
INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 440. See generally Atkinson, supra note 99; Johnson, 
Destroying the Tax Base, supra note 80, at 1382.  
 Excluded from the scope of the INDOPCO regulations are two types of self-created intellectual 
capital. First, costs related to business acquisitions, restructuring, and recapitalizations must be 
capitalized in some cases. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-5; Atkinson, supra note 99, at 228–29; 
Silverman, supra note 103, at 62–64; Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 454–55. Second, 
costs of developing films, sound recordings, video, and books are subject to the more expansive 
capitalization rules applicable to tangible property. I.R.C. § 263A(a)–(b) (2012). Writers, 
photographers and artists are exempt from these capitalization requirements. See id. § 263A(h). 
 110. Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 437; see id. at 438 (speculating that the 
INDOPCO regulations might be invalid and thus might be supplanted by the more expensive 
capitalization required under INDOPCO and other legal precedent but concluding that, as a practical 
matter, taxpayers can rely on the regulations); see also Atkinson, supra note 99, at 224.  
 111. Atkinson, supra note 99, at 229. 
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that a more apt name for the regulations would be the “Anti-INDOPCO 
regulations.”112 
Both prior to and after the Supreme Court’s decision in INDOPCO, an 
extensive body of case law and administrative guidance allowed 
deductions for many specific types of intellectual capital investments.
113
 
Expenses that were deductible before INDOPCO and continue to be 
deductible afterwards include computer software development costs,
114
 
scientific R&D,
115
 and mineral exploration such as intangible drilling costs 
and mining exploration costs.
116
 In cases decided after INDOPCO, several 
courts have allowed financial services businesses to deduct market 
research related to new product development,
117
 and one case upheld a 
bank’s deduction for employee compensation and overhead attributable to 
loan origination.
118
 Advertising is generally deductible, as it was before 
INDOPCO,
119
 as are employer-provided worker training costs.
120
 Two 
 
 
 112. See Yale, INDOPCO Regulations, supra note 80, at 436. 
 113. Although the INDOPCO regulations could be interpreted to preempt prior law relating to the 
capitalization of intangibles, they do not explicitly do so. Furthermore, there is the possibility that the 
INDOPCO regulations might be invalid and supplanted by other legal precedent. See Yale, supra note 
80, at 438. 
 114. See Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303 (holding that the IRS will not challenge a taxpayer’s 
decision to currently deduct costs attributable to software development), superseded on other grounds 
by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-1 C.B. 601, modified in part by Rev. Proc. 2007-16, 2007-1 C.B. 358.  
 115. See I.R.C. § 174(a)(1) (2012). 
 116. See id. §§ 263(c), 617. 
 117. See, e.g., NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 294 (4th Cir. 1982). However, one 
case required a financial services business to capitalize market research where it related to a possible 
business expansion, i.e., the opening of a new branch. See Cent. Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United 
States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1182, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984). This is consistent with the treatment of “start-up 
costs”—costs incurred before the taxpayer is actually engaged in a trade or business—which generally 
must be capitalized. See I.R.C. § 195(a). See generally John W. Lee, Start-Up Costs, Section 195, and 
Clear Reflection of Income: A Tale of Talismans, Tacked-On Tax Reform, and a Touch of Basics, 6 
VA. TAX REV. 1 (1986) (providing an in-depth analysis of I.R.C. § 195, particularly the conflict 
between the definitional and functional tests for the capitalization of start-up business costs, as well as 
the judicial development and practical impact of the provision). 
 118. See PNC Bancorp Inc. v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 2000). However, in another 
case, the tax court required a financial services business to capitalize employee compensation related 
to the acquisition of installment obligations. See Lychuk v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. 374, 375 (2001). The 
INDOPCO regulations require capitalization of costs related to the creation of financial intangibles 
such as loans, but because of the exceptions for employee compensation, overhead, and de minimis 
expenses, loan origination costs are generally not subject to capitalization under the regulations. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(e)(4) (2013).  
 119. See Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57. There are some limited cases where capitalization of 
advertising expenses has been required. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 
Cl. Ct. 220, 231–33 (1985) (requiring capitalization of advertising to defuse opposition to the 
taxpayer’s application for a license to construct a nuclear plant where the expansion to nuclear power 
represented a new business).  
 120. See Rev. Rul. 96-62, 1996-2 C.B. 9. A few cases have held that worker training costs had to 
be capitalized. See, e.g., Cleveland Elec., 7 Cl. Ct. at 227–29 (holding that a utility’s expansion from 
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years after INDOPCO, the IRS ruled that businesses could deduct 
severance payments related to a corporate downsizing.
121
 Several years 
after that, a federal appeals court held that a bank could deduct 
compensation, legal fees, and investigatory fees paid in connection with its 
acquisition of another bank.
122
 The IRS has also ruled that a utility 
company could deduct costs incurred to improve energy conservation and 
efficiency.
123
 
In sum, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in INDOPCO, 
which affirmed capitalization as a fundamental principle of income tax law 
and held that taxpayers must capitalize investments in intellectual capital, 
other provisions of the tax law allow capital owners to deduct almost all 
costs of self-created intellectual capital.  
3. The Magnitude of the Subsidy for Intellectual Capital 
The tax subsidy for self-created intellectual capital makes it less costly 
for capital owners to propertize labor, which magnifies their ability to 
capture a greater share of the returns from their workers.
124
 A deduction 
for an investment is equivalent to a tax exemption on the income from that 
investment.
125
 Thus, the deduction for self-created intellectual capital 
effectively imposes a zero rate of tax on returns from this capital, 
providing a substantial subsidy to capital.
126
 The exact magnitude of the 
subsidy is difficult to ascertain. Self-created intellectual capital likely 
constitutes a significant proportion of total investments in intellectual 
capital because most organizational capital, such as good will, is self-
created.
127
 
 
 
coal powered electricity to nuclear power was a new business, and therefore, costs related to it were 
capital). 
 121. See Rev. Rul. 94-77, 1994-2 C.B. 19. 
 122. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Comm’r, 224 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2000). 
 123. See Rev. Rul. 95-32, 1995-16 I.R.B. 8. This ruling pre-dates INDOPCO, but the IRS did not 
repeal or modify it after the INDOPCO decision.  
 124. It also results in misallocations of resources and inefficiencies. See Kahng, supra note 80, at 
2263–67; Johnson, Undertaxation of Intangibles, supra note 80, at 1289–91. 
 125. See E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in INCOME, 
EMPLOYMENT AND PUBLIC POLICY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ALVIN H. HANSEN 300, 309–10 (1948). 
 126. See Johnson, Undertaxation of Intangibles, supra note 80, at 1289–91; Weisbach, supra note 
80, at 200 (“[T]ax law . . . . allows an immediate deduction, effectively choosing not to tax the return 
to [intangible benefit] activities at all.”); Yale, Capitalization Exceptions, supra note 80, at 555 (noting 
that misidentifying a capital cost as a deductible can cause over or under taxation).  
 Chris Sanchirico makes a similar observation about the deductibility of self-created goodwill, 
brand names, and other intangibles in his analysis of carried interest. See infra notes 170–171 and 
accompanying text. 
 127. I am indebted to Daniel Sichel for insights and information about the mix of acquired and 
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To provide a sense of the magnitude of the tax subsidy for self-created 
intellectual capital, economists estimate that the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, in its measures of economic productivity, expenses, rather than 
capitalizes, $1 trillion or more of yearly investments in intellectual 
capital.
128
 Assuming a comparably large amount is deducted for tax 
purposes, the subsidy is substantial. Furthermore, in 2014, the Finance 
Committee and House Ways & Means Committee proposed to require 
capitalization of just two types of costs—scientific R&D and 
advertising—and estimated that such a change would raise $362 billion in 
tax revenues over ten years.
129
 Because these two types of costs comprise 
only a fraction of all intellectual capital investments, a more 
comprehensive capitalization requirement for self-created intangibles 
would increase tax revenues by several times that estimate.
130
 
The tax subsidy for self-created intellectual capital nominally benefits 
the capital owners who make the expenditures involved in its creation, but 
determining who ultimately benefits is a complex empirical question that 
has not yet been studied. The tax subsidy for self-created intellectual 
capital might cause more resources to be allocated to intellectual capital 
relative to other investments, such as plant or equipment.
131
 In other 
words, the tax subsidy might result in the intellectual capital “pie” 
growing bigger, and the question is then, who benefits from the bigger pie: 
intellectual capital owners, their workers, or both?
132
 Another way to 
 
 
self-created intellectual capital. With respect to organizational capital, businesses do sometimes 
acquire it through the acquisition of an ongoing business. However, this is likely a small fraction of 
total organizational capital investments because only a small proportion of all companies change hands 
during a given time period. Experts estimate that mergers and acquisitions volume has averaged 6.5% 
of total global market capitalization over the last thirty years. SEE STEFANO GATTI & CARLO 
CHIARELLA, M&A IN UNCERTAIN TIMES: IS THERE STILL VALUE IN GROWING? 1 (2013), 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/ our-thinking/archive/bocconi-conference-2013/bocconi-report.pdf. 
 128. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 129.  See U.S. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 113TH CONG., SUMMARY OF STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT: 
COST RECOVERY AND ACCOUNTING 8 (2013) [hereinafter U.S. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, COST 
RECOVERY]; Tax Reform Act of 2014, 113th Cong. § 3108 (Discussion Draft 2014) 55–56 [hereinafter 
Tax Reform Act of 2014 Discussion Draft], http://waysandmeans.house.gov/uploadedfiles/statutory
_text_tax_reform_ act_of_2014_discussion_draft__022614.pdf (proposing to capitalize and amortize 
over five years R&D and fifty percent of advertising). 
 130. Economists estimate scientific R&D to comprise less than one-fifth of all investments in 
intellectual capital. See Corrado et al., Intangible Capital, supra note 27, at 671 tbl.1. For the years 
2000–2003, they estimate total annual investment in intellectual capital to be $1.226 trillion and 
scientific R&D to be $230.5 billion. Id. 
 131. See Kahng, supra note 80, at 2263–64. 
 132. Leandra Lederman has similarly argued that the tax law’s liberal loss deductibility rules for 
active trades and businesses under I.R.C. § 162 encourage investment in active businesses as compared 
to passive investments. See Leandra Lederman, The Entrepreneurship Effect: An Accidental 
Externality in the Federal Income Tax, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1401, 1444–55 (2004). 
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analyze this question is to consider the consequences of eliminating the tax 
subsidy for intellectual capital. Eliminating the subsidy (that is, requiring 
capitalization of the costs of creating intellectual capital) would increase 
business owners’ post-tax costs for self-created intellectual capital, which 
might cause them to reduce wages. On the other hand, requiring 
capitalization would make propertization more costly for business owners, 
which would in turn reduce their share of the returns from economic 
productivity (assuming it is true that propertization enables business 
owners to increase their share of returns). In addition, capitalization would 
help to equalize the treatment of business owners and workers in the 
development of human capital.  
B. Human Capital Investments 
Scholars such as Katherine Stone argue that employers, by controlling 
their workers through restrictive covenants and other legal mechanisms, in 
effect acquire ownership of human capital.
133
 These scholars acknowledge 
this claim is somewhat metaphorical because except for the case of 
slavery, human capital, unlike other forms of capital, is not entirely 
marketable and controllable.
134
 As Gary Becker states, “you cannot 
separate a person from his or her knowledge, skills, health, or values the 
way it is possible to move financial and physical assets while the owner 
stays put.”135 
Metaphor or not, what is literally true is that business owners make 
human capital investments in their workers
136
 and treat them as valuable, 
 
 
 133. See Stone, supra note 49; Joellen Riley, Who Owns Human Capital? A Critical Appraisal of 
Legal Techniques for Capturing the Value of Work, 18 J. AUSTL. LABOUR L. 1, 24 (2005) (describing 
the term “[h]uman capital” as a “colourful metaphor for the contribution that people’s work and talent 
make in commercial enterprise”). But see PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 223 (questioning whether human 
capital is illusory). 
 134. See Riley, supra note 133, at 24. 
 135. GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 16 (3d ed. 1993). 
 136. Intellectual capital and human capital are closely related but not coterminous. Broadly 
speaking, human capital refers to resources in people or human capabilities that produce future 
monetary and psychic income. See id. at 15–16. Intellectual capital focuses on businesses’ investment 
in and production of intangible sources of future value, which often require a high proportion of labor 
inputs. Human capital focuses on an individual’s capabilities to produce future value. Capital owners 
can make human capital investments in their workers—training, for example—and workers can also 
make human capital investments in themselves. Investment in human capital includes formal 
education, on-the-job training, healthcare, and migration. Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human 
Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 9–13 (1961). But see PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 223 (suggesting that 
human capital is illusory). 
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albeit risky and difficult to manage, assets.
137
 As discussed above, they are 
particularly inclined to make human capital investments in their workers 
when propertization enables them to capture the return on these 
investments.
138
 Workers similarly make human capital investments in 
themselves, although, as discussed above, they are less likely to do so 
when the returns are likely to redound to the benefit of their employers.
139
 
The tax law treats human capital investments differently depending on 
who makes the investments, as Mary Louise Fellows and I have argued.
140
 
When capital owners make investments in human capital and otherwise 
incur human-capital related expenses in their production of income, the 
law recognizes these are legitimate costs of economic production and 
allows them to be offset (that is, deducted) in the computation of taxable 
income.
141
 In contrast, when workers make the same investments and incur 
the same expenses in their production of income, the law either treats these 
costs as entirely personal expenses or otherwise places limits on the ability 
 
 
 Scholars typically measure returns to human capital by reference to individuals’ increased income 
resulting from investments in education, healthcare, and the like. See generally BECKER, supra note 
135, at 147–200 (providing an empirical analysis of the effect of college education on earnings and 
productivity); Dale W. Jorgenson & Barbara M. Fraumeni, The Accumulation of Human and 
Nonhuman Capital, 1948–84, in THE MEASUREMENT OF SAVING, INVESTMENT, AND WEALTH 227–78 
(Robert E. Lipsey & Helen Stone Tice eds., 1989) (estimating, inter alia, the effect of education on 
lifetime labor income); Luca Benzoni & Olena Chyruk, The Value and Risk of Human Capital, 7 ANN. 
REV. FIN. ECON. 179 (2015) (surveying the theoretical and empirical approaches to valuing human 
capital).  
 137. See BECKER, supra note 135, at 20–21; Rita Almeida & Pedro Carneiro. The Return to Firm 
Investments in Human Capital, 16 LABOUR ECON. 97 (2009). As Mousumi Battycharya and Patrick 
Wright state, in describing the challenges of managing what they call “human capital assets”:   
[H]uman capital is different from other real assets in a few ways. First, human capital is 
almost entirely intangible and is difficult to quantify. . . . Second, unlike other forms of asset, 
a firm never fully ‘owns’ its human capital. The knowledge, skills, and abilities reside in the 
people, and are lost when people leave the firm. Therefore there is a unique risk associated 
with human capital, the risk of capital loss or turnover (i.e., the asset “walking away”). . . . 
Third, non-financial investments like time, communication, and leadership constitute a major 
part of investments that generate returns from human capital through eliciting commitment 
and competency of employees over the long run. These combined with the fact that human 
capital is almost never tradable in the market, makes management of this form of asset a more 
difficult task. 
Mousumi Battacharya & Patrick M. Wright, Options for Human Capital Acquisition, in THE 
ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO STRATEGIC HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (John Storey et al. eds., 
2008). 
 138. See Garmaise, supra note 57, at 413–14 (finding that employers invest more in their 
employees’ human capital when they can restrict their employees’ mobility through the use of 
covenants not to compete). 
 139. See id. (finding that employees invest less in their own human capital when they are bound to 
their employers by restrictive covenants). 
 140. See Mary Louise Fellows & Lily Kahng, Costly Mistakes: Undertaxed Business Owners and 
Overtaxed Workers, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329 (2013). 
 141. See id. at 370–80. 
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of workers to offset them against taxable income. In this way, the tax law 
undertaxes capital owners and overtaxes workers.
142
 
Education is the most important example of the disparate treatment of 
business owners’ and workers’ investments in human capital. Gary Becker 
cites education and training as “the most important investments in human 
capital.”143 Yet, from the earliest days of the income tax, the courts and 
IRS have denied workers the ability to deduct their educational expenses 
except under limited circumstances.
144
 The IRS acknowledges that 
education might be a human capital investment, but allows no deduction 
or capitalization of educational expenses because they are “an inseparable 
aggregate of personal and capital expenditures."
145
 Although tax law 
 
 
 142. See id. 
 143. BECKER, supra note 135, at 17; see also PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 306–07. Education 
unquestionably contributes to workers’ productivity. SEE SANDRA E. BLACK & LISA M. LYNCH, 
HUMAN-CAPITAL INVESTMENTS AND PRODUCTIVITY, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 263 (1996). Economists and 
policy makers perennially bemoan the future of the under-educated U.S. workforce and call for more 
government investment in education, particularly in light of the economy’s shift from manufacturing 
to services and technology. See generally DALE NEEF, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (1998); ROBERT 
REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21ST CENTURY CAPITALISM (1992); 
Walter W. Powell & Kaisa Snellman, The Knowledge Economy, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 199, 199–201 
(2004); TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION, THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY: IS 
THE UNITED STATES LOSING ITS COMPETITIVE EDGE? (2005), http//futureofinnovation.org/PDF/ 
Benchmarks.pdf; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, PUBLIC POLICY FOR KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (1999), 
http://akgul.bilkent.edu.tr/BT-BE/knowledge-economy.pdf. Another metric demonstrating the income-
producing value of education is the link between higher educational levels and higher incomes. For 
example, in 2010, those with a college degree earned about sixty-six percent more than those with a 
high school degree; those with a professional or doctoral degree earned more than two and a half times 
the amount earned by high school degree holders. U. S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT PROJECTIONS, EDUCATION PAYS (2011), http://www.bls.gov 
/emp/ep_chart_001.htm. The correlation between levels of education and income is strong and 
persistent. See Stuart Lazar, Schooling Congress: The Current Landscape of the Tax Treatment of 
Higher Education Expenses and a Framework for Reform, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1047, 1049–51 
(2010); SANDY BAUM ET AL., COLLEGE BOARD ADVOCACY AND POLICY CENTER, EDUCATION PAYS 
2010: THE BENEFITS OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETY 11–17 (2010), 
http://trends.college board.org/downloads/EducationPays2010.pdf. 
 144. See, e.g., I.T. 1520, I-2 C.B. 145 (1922), revoked by I.T. 2688, XII-1 C.B. 250 (1933) 
(holding that research expenses by a college professor were personal, nondeductible expenses); Appeal 
of Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926) (holding that voice lessons in preparation for a professional singing 
career were personal). For a detailed account of the history of the tax treatment of educational 
expenses, see Jay Katz, The Deductibility of Education Costs: Why Does Congress Allow the IRS to 
Take Your Education So Personally?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 1, 17–37 (1997); Lazar, supra note 143, at 
1057–68; James L. Musselman, Federal Income Tax Deductibility of Higher Education Costs: The 
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 923, 927–34 (2007). 
 145. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(1) (as amended in 1967); see Lazar, supra note 143, at 1059, 1072. 
Only under limited circumstances is a worker allowed to deduct higher educational expenses: (1) the 
education must maintain or improve her skills in her trade or business or (2) it must be required by her 
employer or by law. In any case, the education acquired cannot be necessary to meet the minimum 
qualifications for the worker’s trade or business, and it cannot qualify the worker for a new trade or 
business. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5.   
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provides several subsidies for education, such as a deduction for student 
loan interest and tax credits for educational expense, all of these 
provisions are classified as special tax preferences rather than as legitimate 
costs of producing income.
146
 In contrast, business owners’ expenditures 
for worker training or education are usually deductible immediately as 
I.R.C. § 162 trade or business expenses. At worst, business owners may 
have to capitalize these expenditures and amortize them over some period 
of years.
147
  
As with education, tax law treats as purely personal many other 
expenditures that are at least in part human capital investments or costs 
related to the production of income. For example, two other major 
categories of expenditures that are integral to workers’ productivity are 
health and child care costs. As with education, both of these suffer from 
having personal and social dimensions that do not fit comfortably within 
the traditional business model of economic productivity. Because 
businesses do not literally own human capital, they do not incur child care 
and medical expenses in the production of income.
148
 Workers’ child care 
 
 
 146. In addition to this limited I.R.C. § 162 deduction for the costs of higher education, the tax 
law provides several tax preferences for education, including the I.R.C. § 25A American Opportunity 
Credit and Lifetime Learning Credit, the I.R.C. § 221 deduction for educational loan interest, the 
I.R.C. § 527 exclusion for employer-provided educational assistance, the I.R.C. § 529 exclusion for 
qualified tuition programs, and the I.R.C. § 530 exclusion for “Coverdell” education savings accounts. 
For a complete list of tax preferences for education, see Lazar, supra note 143, at 1074–1107. 
However, all of these provisions are classified as tax expenditures—that is, preferences that purposely 
reduce tax liability below “normal” levels in order to advance social policy goals—rather than as 
legitimate costs of producing income under the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income. See STAFF 
OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL 
YEARS 2011-2015, at 10, 12–14 (Comm. Print 2012) [hereinafter Joint Committee Tax Expenditure 
Estimates].  
 Many scholars have criticized the current tax treatment of educational expenses and have argued 
that they ought to be at least partially deductible or capitalized and recoverable in future years in order 
to measure income from labor accurately. See, e.g., David S. Davenport, Education and Human 
Capital: Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793 
(1992); Katz, supra note 144; Lazar, supra note 143; Michael Simkovic, The Knowledge Tax, 82 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1981 (2015). But see Joseph M. Dodge, Taxing Human Capital Acquisition Costs—Or 
Why Costs of Higher Education Should Not Be Deducted or Amortized, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 927 (1993) 
(arguing that higher education expenses should not be amortized).  
 147. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 148. It’s interesting to contemplate how the tax law would tax slave owners if legal slavery existed 
today. There is little historic guidance because in the pre-Civil War era, slave owners paid primarily 
property and excise taxes on their slaves. See generally ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICA TAXATION, 
AMERICAN SLAVERY (2008) (providing a historical account of the influence of slavery on United 
States tax law and policy); Joel S. Newman, Slave Tax as Sin Tax: 18th and 19th Century Perspectives, 
101 TAX NOTES 1019 (2003) (describing the history of federal taxes on slavery). States that had 
income taxes, such as Virginia, exempted slave owners from tax. See CHARLES NORDHOFF, AMERICA 
FOR FREE WORKING MEN! 14–16 (1865). However, there is evidence that slave owners considered 
their slaves to be valuable investments and kept meticulous records of their value and productivity. See 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2017] WHO OWNS HUMAN CAPITAL? 637 
 
 
 
 
expenses are viewed as personal because it is a personal decision whether 
to have children. Workers are eligible for a modest credit for childcare 
expenses or can exclude from income a relatively small value of 
employer-provided childcare.
149
 Congress treats these provisions as special 
tax preferences for personal expenditures, as opposed to allowances that 
account for legitimate costs in the production of income.
150
 Similarly, 
Congress allows workers to deduct medical expenses and provides 
additional special tax preferences related to healthcare, but in all cases 
characterizes health care expenditures as personal, and not as investments 
in human capital.
151
  
 
 
Caitlin Rosenthal, Slavery’s Scientific Management: Masters and Managers, in SLAVERY’S 
CAPITALISM: A NEW HISTORY OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Sven Beckert & Seth 
Rockman eds., 2016) (finding that slave owners kept highly detailed records of the value and 
productivity of slaves and depreciated them over time, foreshadowing modern management practices). 
If one imagines the unimaginable—a world in which slavery existed legally in the United States 
today—it seems quite plausible that slave owners would be allowed to deduct or capitalize costs of 
providing shelter, training, healthcare, food, and childcare to their slaves, expenses that are all 
disallowed as personal expenses when free workers incur them.  
 149. See I.R.C. § 21 (2012) (childcare credit); I.R.C. § 129 (exclusion for employer-provided child 
care).  
 150. See Joint Committee Tax Expenditure Estimates, supra note 146, at 14. Many scholars have 
criticized the tax law’s treatment of child care expenses and posited that they ought to be at least 
partially deductible under a Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income. See, e.g., Grace Blumberg, 
Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 
BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1971); Mary Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of Employment-
Related Child-Care Expenditures, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1998); Mary L. Heen, Welfare 
Reform, Child Care Costs, and Taxes: Delivering Increased Work-Related Child Care Benefits to 
Low-Income Families, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 173 (1995); Shannon Weeks McCormack, 
Overtaxing the Working Family: Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559 
(2016); Allan J. Samansky, Child Care Expenses and the Income Tax, 50 FLA. L. REV. 245 (1998); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Children and the Income Tax, 49 TAX L. REV. 349 (1994). But see Tsilly Dagan, 
Ordinary People, Necessary Choices: A Comparative Study of Childcare Expenses, 11 THEORETICAL 
INQ. L. 589, 625 (2010) (arguing that the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition is incapable of adequately 
reflecting outlays, such as child care, and advocating for the adoption of additional norms into the 
definition of income). 
 151. Medical expenses are deductible under I.R.C. § 213, but they are classified as personal 
deductions rather than costs related to the production of income. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 50 (Comm. 
Print 1987) (stating that "medical expenses essentially are personal expenses and thus, like food, 
clothing, and other expenditures of living and other consumption expenditures, generally should not be 
deductible in measuring taxable income"). In addition, the medical expense deduction has always been 
limited by a significant “floor” tied to adjusted gross income—that is, a taxpayer can deduct only those 
medical expenses in excess of a percentage (currently ten percent) of her adjusted gross income. See 
I.R.C. § 213(a). In addition, the medical expense deduction is “below-the-line,” so only those 
taxpayers who itemize their deductions can deduct any of their medical expenses. I.R.C. § §§ 62(a)(1), 
63. 
 In addition to I.R.C. § 213, there are other tax provisions related to health care. The law excludes 
from income employer-provided health insurance. I.R.C. § 106(a). It also excludes from income 
medical expenses paid from Flexible Spending Arrangements, I.R.C. § 125, and Medical 
Reimbursement Plans, I.R.C. §§ 105, 106. In addition, I.R.C. § 106 provides for tax deferred treatment 
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In addition to education, child care, and health care, workers incur a 
variety of expenditures related to their work, such as outlays for 
commuting, clothing, and food and lodging, to name a few noteworthy 
examples. These are often described as “mixed personal and business” 
expenses, which reflects the reality that these expenditures have an 
element of consumption but are also connected to the worker’s trade or 
business.
152
 Yet, tax law generally treats these outlays as purely personal. 
The cost of commuting, for example, has long been held to be 
nondeductible on the grounds that it is the taxpayer’s personal choice 
whether, and how far, to live from his or her place of work.
153
 Similarly, 
clothing is considered a purely personal expense except in rare instances 
(such as police or military uniforms), even when such clothing is required 
as a condition of employment and is worn exclusively at work.
154
 Food 
and lodging expenses are also treated as nondeductible personal expenses 
except in limited circumstances.
155
  
With respect to mixed personal and business expenses, business owners 
enjoy a greater ability than workers to deduct their costs of producing 
income under § 162. For example, business owners can deduct business-
related travel, lodging and meal expenses paid on behalf of their workers, 
and these amounts are also fully excluded from the income of their 
 
 
of amounts invested in Health Savings Accounts. As is true for tax provisions on education and child 
care, all of these health care provisions are treated as tax expenditures. See Joint Committee Tax 
Expenditure Estimates, supra note 146, at 42 (listing the medical expense deduction, employer-paid 
health insurance, medical savings accounts, and other related items as tax expenditures). 
 152. See, e.g., Thomas D. Griffith, Efficient Taxation of Mixed Personal and Business Expenses, 
41 UCLA L. REV. 1769, 1770 (1994). In measuring poverty, the National Academy of Sciences 
recommended that work-related expenses such as commuting, child care, and the purchase of tools and 
uniforms be treated as nondiscretionary expenses and subtracted from resources. See MEASURING 
POVERTY: A NEW APPROACH 4-5 (Constance F. Citro & Robert T. Michael eds., 1995). In 2011, an 
interagency task force including the U.S. Census Bureau, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Council of 
Economic Advisers, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the Office of 
Management and Budget adopted this recommendation. See KATHLEEN SHORT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, THE RESEARCH SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE: 2010, at 21–
22 (2011), http://www.census.gov/hhes/povmeas/methodology/supplemental/research/Short_ Research 
SPM2010.pdf. 
 153. Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473–74 (1946). See generally Tsilly Dagan, Commuting, 
26 VA. TAX REV. 185 (2006); William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax 
Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 871 
(1969). 
 154. See Pevsner v. Comm’r, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980). Clothing expenses are deductible only 
if the clothing is worn exclusively at work, as a condition of employment, and is not adaptable for 
general usage as ordinary clothing. Id. at 469. 
 155. See I.R.C. § 119 (providing an exclusion from income for meals and lodging provided to an 
employee by the employer “for the convenience of the employer”); I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (allowing 
deduction for food and lodging “while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss3/6
  
 
 
 
 
2017] WHO OWNS HUMAN CAPITAL? 639 
 
 
 
 
workers.
 156
 In contrast, when workers incur their own business-related 
travel, lodging and meal expenses, the expenses are more likely to be 
treated as personal, nondeductible expenditures.
157
 Furthermore, even if 
the expenditures qualify as business-related deductions, there are structural 
limitations such as the two percent floor that limits workers’ ability to 
make use of these deductions.
158
  
In sum, the tax law, by allowing capital owners to deduct the costs of 
self-created intellectual capital, subsidizes the propertization of labor and 
enhances capital owners’ ability to appropriate a greater share of the return 
at the expense of their workers’ share. In addition, the disparate treatment 
of capital owners’ and workers’ human capital investments adds to capital 
owners’ tax advantages relative to workers.159 In these heretofore 
unexamined ways, the tax law puts a heavy thumb on the scale in favor of 
capital owners; a scale, as Piketty has shown, that already tilts in their 
favor. 
III. RECONSIDERING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL 
A. A Porous and Changeable Boundary  
Part I described how capital owners are able to use intellectual 
property, contract, and employment laws to propertize labor inputs into the 
creation of intellectual capital. Their ability to do so is expanding as a 
result of the evolving legal landscape, and the boundary between labor and 
capital is shifting. This suggests that the boundary is not fixed and 
immutable, but rather porous and changeable.
160
 This Part explores the tax 
implications of a boundary of this nature and calls into question the tax 
law’s fundamental labor-capital dichotomy. 
 
 
 156. See Fellows & Kahng, supra note 140, at 370–76. 
 157. See id. at 372–76. 
 158. See id. at 370–72. 
 159. These subsidies for capital owners also result in misallocations of resources and 
inefficiencies. See Fellows & Kahng, supra note 140, at 380–87; Johnson, Undertaxation of 
Intangibles, supra note 80, at 1289–91; Kahng, supra note 80, at 2263–67. 
 160. See Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 7, at 458 (observing that “‘labor’ and ‘capital’ are not 
nearly as distinct, either economically or socially, as [Piketty] may appear to suggest”); Victor 
Fleischer, Alpha: Labor Is the New Capital, TAX L. REV., at 3 (forthcoming 2016) (referring to a 
blurring of the distinction between income from labor and income from capital in in his analysis of 
what he calls “alpha income”, that is, carried interest, founders stock, and equity-based executive 
compensation). In contrast, Piketty believes the distinction between capital income and labor income is 
becoming sharper: “[T]he growing sophistication of capital markets and financial intermediation tends 
to separate owners from managers more and more and thus to sharpen the distinction between pure 
capital income and labor income.” PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 424. 
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The boundary between labor and capital has been extensively analyzed 
in the scholarly debate about “carried interest”—the profits interest 
received by a private equity fund manager as compensation for managerial 
services.
161
 Under the partnership tax rules, the fund manager’s receipt of a 
profits interest is not immediately taxable. Instead, the fund manager 
reports income in the future as the fund realizes profits, and the character 
of those profits—usually capital gain—flows through to the fund 
manager.
162
 The debate about this result focuses on two questions: (1) 
Whether fund managers should be taxed immediately upon receipt of the 
profits interest, rather than being able to defer the tax until the fund 
realizes profits;
163
 and (2) whether all or a portion of the income should be 
 
 
 161. See Bradley T. Borden, Profits-Only Partnership Interests, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1283 (2009); 
Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1 (2008); Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122 TAX NOTES 743 
(2009); Adam H. Rosenzweig, Not All Carried Interests Are Created Equal, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
713 (2009); Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers 
with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071 (2008) [hereinafter 
Sanchirico, Tax Advantage]; Sanchirico, Taxing Carried Interest, supra note 45; David A. Weisbach, 
The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008); see also Laura E. 
Cunningham, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services, 47 TAX L. REV. 247 (1991); Mark 
P. Gergen, Pooling or Exchange: The Taxation of Joint Ventures Between Labor and Capital, 44 TAX. 
L. REV. 519 (1989) [hereinafter Gergen, Pooling]; Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: 
Compensating Service Partners, 48 TAX L. REV. 69 (1992) [hereinafter Gergen, Service Partners]; 
Henry Ordower, Taxing Service Partners to Achieve Horizontal Equity, 46 TAX LAW. 19 (1992); Leo 
L. Schmolka, Commentary, Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services: Let 
Diamond/Campbell Quietly Die, 47 TAX L. REV. 287 (1991). 
 162. See generally Weisbach, supra note 161, at 727–33 (describing how partnership profits 
interests are taxed). 
 163. The first question relates primarily to determining the cost of the labor inputs provided by a 
service partner whose compensation takes the form of a profits interest that is speculative and illiquid. 
See Fleischer, supra note 161, at 38 (“The strongest argument for deferral is the difficulty of 
measuring a partner’s income on an accrual basis. This argument is especially strong in the context of 
venture capital and private equity funds, where the underlying investments are illiquid.”).  
 Beyond the specific situation of carried interest, determining the cost of labor inputs is often 
difficult, especially for intellectual capital. This difficulty is addressed in the extensive literature 
devoted to “knowledge management,” that is how businesses can best account for and deploy their 
human capital assets. See generally THOMAS H. DAVENPORT & LAURENCE PRUSAK, WORKING 
KNOWLEDGE: HOW ORGANIZATIONS MANAGE WHAT THEY KNOW (1998); IKUJIRO NONAKA & 
HIROTAKA TAKEUCHI, THE KNOWLEDGE-CREATING COMPANY: HOW JAPANESE COMPANIES CREATE 
THE DYNAMICS OF INNOVATION (1995); SVEIBY, supra note 40. The vast literature on intellectual 
capital and knowledge management is evidenced by several journals dedicated to the subject, 
including the Journal of Intellectual Capital, the Journal of Knowledge Management, and Knowledge 
and Process Management. In addition, there are innumerable books, articles, and reports on the 
subject. 
 For example, the creation of a new inventory system might involve the efforts of many different 
employees whose work effort is spread among many tasks and projects. It might also include investing 
in new computer software and hardware. It would be difficult to determine how much of each worker’s 
labor should be allocated to the creation of the new inventory system. However, the difference 
between the carried interest situation and this example is that there is no need to allocate an 
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taxed as ordinary income, like most other compensation income, rather 
than as capital gain.  
This second question relates to the demarcation between income from 
labor and income from capital.
164
 Critics of the current tax law’s treatment 
of carried interest argue that some or all of the service partner’s income 
represents compensation for services, and as such, should be taxed as 
ordinary income.
165
 In response, other scholars have pointed out that the 
tax system often allows such a conversion of labor income into capital 
gain, specifically in the case of so-called sweat equity.
166
 Sweat equity 
arises when an individual provides labor to his own business, drawing no 
salary or a below-market salary. If he ultimately sells the business, he will 
in many cases realize a capital gain, thereby converting his foregone 
salary, which would have been taxed as ordinary income, into capital 
gain.
167
 Examples of sweat equity often involve sole proprietors such as 
grocers or dry cleaners, but as David Weisbach points out, Bill Gates is an 
owner of sweat equity: his fortune is attributable to services he performed 
for Microsoft, but most of his earnings will be taxed as capital gains.
168
 In 
light of this widespread ability to convert self-supplied labor into capital 
gain, Weisbach argues, it is irrational to single out carried interest as 
objectionable.
169
  
It is beyond the scope of this Article to undertake a full analysis of the 
carried interest debate. Rather, this Article extends the debate’s insights 
about how self-supplied labor is converted into capital gains beyond the 
 
 
employee’s salary among the assets she helps to create or enhance in order to determine the amount of 
compensation she receives, assuming she is paid in cash. 
 164. This question also arises in connection with so-called entrepreneurial income—that is, 
income of a sole proprietor who contributes both labor and capital to her business. Piketty gives the 
example of a radiologist, whose income derives from both her labor and the equipment she uses. See 
PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 204; see also Kleinbard, supra note 5. However, according to Piketty, 
entrepreneurial income accounts for a very small proportion of income—one to two percent. See 
PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 204.  
 165. See Fleischer, supra note 161, at 37; Gergen, Service Partners, supra note 161, at 103–11. 
 166. See Fleischer, supra note 161, at 28; Weisbach, supra note 161, at 744.  
 167. See Fleischer, supra note 161, at 35–36. 
 168. Weisbach, supra note 161, at 743–44 n.70. Weisbach identifies two factors that determine 
when labor income will be converted into capital gains: “First, the more entrepreneurial the activity, 
the more likely the treatment will be capital. Second, the more that labor and capital are combined into 
a single return, the more likely it will be treated as capital.” Weisbach, supra note 161, at 743 n.70. As 
discussed below, I disagree with him with regard to the second factor. Capital owners are able to 
convert labor of workers into capital all the time. See also Leandra Lederman, supra note 132(finding 
that the tax law subsidizes entrepreneurs, that is, those who contribute both labor and capital, as 
compared to passive investors, who contribute only capital).  
 169. Weisbach argues further that the line between capital gains and ordinary income exemplifies 
the sort of arbitrary line drawing found in tax law, as do many aspects of partnership taxation. 
Weisbach, supra note 161, at 743–63. 
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limited situation of self-supplied labor. More broadly, as the discussion of 
intellectual capital shows, capital owners convert other people’s labor—
that of their workers—into capital through the process of propertization. 
Furthermore, the tax law subsidizes this process by allowing capital 
owners to deduct the costs of creating intellectual capital.  
Chris Sanchirico makes this same observation about the broader 
phenomenon of the conversion of labor into capital gain in his analysis of 
carried interest. He argues that it is fruitless to analogize carried interest to 
sweat equity on the grounds that both allow for the tax-advantaged 
conversion of labor income into capital gains. It is fruitless, he argues, 
because virtually everyone enjoys this tax-advantaged conversion of labor 
into capital gain, even capital owners who do not provide their own labor, 
by reason of the immediate deductibility of labor costs: 
“[J]udging from how the supposed sweat equity tax advantage has 
been described, one of its seemingly essential features is that it 
accrues specifically to services that are self-provided. . . . Yet the 
tax benefit of premature labor cost recovery is hardly dependent on 
labor’s being self-provided. The salaries a business pays to 
employees who work in the marketing department building a brand 
name are likely expensed, even though the brand name may 
eventually garner long-term capital gains income. Indeed, the salary 
of every employee whose services help to keep the concern going is 
to some extent an investment in going concern value.
170
 
Although Sanchirico’s analysis does not refer to the ability of capital 
owners to propertize labor into intellectual capital, this is exactly what he 
describes when he alludes to the ability of business owners who pay 
workers to produce a brand name or going concern value.
171
 Furthermore, 
Sanchirico’s argument assumes that business owners can deduct 
immediately their workers’ salaries despite the fact that the workers 
contribute to the creation of assets of long-term value. This is exactly the 
tax subsidy for self-created intellectual capital that this Article identifies as 
a subsidy to the process of propertization.   
 
 
 170. Sanchirico, Taxing Carried Interest, supra note 45, at 242. 
 171. Sanchirico argues further that supposed tax benefit that all these parties enjoy—the ability to 
convert labor income into capital gains—is illusory when one takes into account the aggregate tax paid 
by all participants. According to Sanchirico, the true tax advantage to carried interest inheres in 
exploiting the tax rate differentials of fund managers and investors. See Sanchirico, Tax Advantage, 
supra note 161, at 1076. 
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B. Returns on Human Capital  
As Part II discussed, the legal landscape related to intellectual capital is 
shifting the boundary between labor and capital and enabling capital 
owners to capture a greater share of economic returns. This suggests that 
capital owners are in some sense able to capture some of the returns to 
labor.
172
 This is a somewhat confusing statement because purely as a 
definitional matter, “returns to labor” describes the amount received by 
workers and “returns to capital”, the amount received by capital owners.173 
However, the process of propertization shows how capital owners capture 
at least some of the returns to labor. Furthermore, capital owners make 
investments in human capital, and presumably they receive returns on 
these investments.
174
 Therefore, it is reasonable to say that capital owners 
receive some of the returns to labor.  
If it is true that capital owners capture some of the returns to labor, this 
calls into question the tax law’s distinction between income from labor 
and income from capital, along with its disparate treatment of the two 
categories. Not all income from labor is subject to onerous taxation 
relative to income from capital. Rather, income from labor paid to workers 
is taxed heavily. Income paid to capital owners, whether attributable to 
labor or capital, is taxed lightly. Thus, income from labor is taxed very 
differently depending on who receives the return from the labor.  
Under this view, one could reframe the tax treatment of capital owners 
and workers to say that they are taxed differently on their respective shares 
of income from labor.
175
 This reframing matters because it requires us to 
re-evaluate the rationales for taxing income from labor so differently from 
 
 
 172. Employment law scholars who criticize employer restrictions on employees frame the 
analysis in terms of who should be entitled to reap the benefits of the worker’s labor, employer or 
worker. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 49, at 721–23.  
 173. See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 6, at 203 (discussing the clear distinction between 
remuneration of labor (wages, salaries, bonuses, and other payments to employees, including 
managers, who contribute labor to the company’s activities) and remuneration of capital (dividends, 
interest, profits reinvested to increase the value of the firms’ capital, etc.); Kleinbard, supra note 5, at 
49 (“[T]he suppliers of labor and capital can be expected to define for themselves the relative 
contributions of each through the process of setting wages; the post-compensation remainder by 
definition must be capital income.”). 
 174. Knowledge management scholars frame questions of employee mobility around the idea of 
protecting firms from expropriation of value and/or ensuring that firms protect their human capital 
investments and garner the returns from those investments. See, e.g., Younge, supra note 77, at 2–6. 
 175. Conversely, one might also characterize part of workers’ income as a return on capital, as in 
the case of entrepreneurial income or carried interest. 
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income from capital.
176
 On an intuitive level, it seems irrational and unfair 
that the tax treatment of labor income should turn on the identity of the 
person—worker or capital owner—who derives the income from labor.177 
Beyond intuition, taxing the workers more heavily than capital owners on 
their respective share of returns to labor seems clearly to exacerbate “rich-
get-richer dynamic”178 documented by Piketty. 
C. Workers and Capital Owners as Joint Venturers 
The tax law’s distinct treatment of income from labor and income from 
capital assumes that the economic production can be disaggregated into 
these two types of income.
179
 However, the discussion of intellectual 
capital highlights the interdependent relationship between labor and capital 
in economic productivity. This interdependence raises the question 
whether labor income and capital income can or should be viewed as 
separate types of income.  
Carried interest provides a useful jumping off point to consider this 
question. In their analyses of carried interest, scholars argue that at least 
part of what the service partner receives is compensation for his labor, and 
should therefore be taxed as such.
180
 The difficulty lies in determining how 
much of what the services partner receives should be treated this way. As 
Victor Fleischer puts it, “the key challenge is disaggregating the relative 
value of the returns on human capital, which we would presumably like to 
tax currently as the services are performed, from the returns on investment 
capital, which we would like to tax only when the income is realized.” 181 
 
 
 176. Victor Fleischer makes a related argument in the context of what he calls “alpha income”— 
carried interest, founders stock, and equity-based executive compensation. He argues that alpha 
income is labor income disguised as capital income and that the best way to achieve an equitable tax 
treatment of this disguised labor income would be to repeal the capital gains preference. See Fleischer, 
supra note 160, at 28, 42. Fleischer’s argument differs from the views advanced in this Article in that 
Fleischer accepts the assumption that labor income and capital income are fixed and distinct 
categories. 
 177. On the other hand, we treat trade or business income differently from investor gains, so the 
identity of the person who derives the income does matter sometimes. However, this example may 
devolve back to the same suspect classifications of labor income and capital income because trade or 
business income implies a requisite level of labor activity in its production. 
 178. Robert Solow coined this term to describe Piketty’s thesis. Solow, supra note 11. 
 179. According to Fleischer, public finance economists also regularly make this assumption. See 
Fleischer, supra note 160, at 10. 
 180. See Fleischer, supra note 161, at 47; Gergen, Service Partners, supra note 161, at 103–11.  
 181. Fleischer, supra note 161, at 41.  
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In response to this disaggregation challenge, Borden argues that it is 
impossible to disaggregate returns on labor and returns on capital where 
partners contribute a mix of labor and capital:  
The co-ownership of partnership property and services makes 
tracing income from either the contributed property or services to 
the contributor impossible. A tax partnership’s income flows from 
the combined output of partnership property and services, over both 
of which the partners share control. Sharing control and the residual 
claims of integrated property and services gives partnerships their 
distinctive nature. In particular, the parties cannot trace income 
from its source to a single owner of the source.
182
 
In Borden’s view, this inability to disaggregate explains why income from 
the combined sources should be treated as partnership income. To be 
characterized at the partnership level: “The partners cannot separately 
trace income from property and services. The income from one source 
fuses with the income from the other source. The income from the 
combined sources becomes partnership income and flows to the partners 
with the character determined at the partnership level.”183 
Borden’s observation about the inseparability of labor income and 
capital income has a broader applicability, particularly as it relates to 
intellectual capital, where labor and capital are deeply intertwined.
184
 In 
view of the increasing prevalence of intellectual capital, one can question 
 
 
 182. Borden, supra note 161, at 1300. More generally, other scholars have explored at length 
whether and to what extent the tax law should treat a partnership as a pooling of partners’ services and 
property, or alternatively, as an exchange of their services and property. See, e.g., Gergen, Pooling, 
supra note 161. 
 183. Borden, supra note 161, at 1301 (footnotes omitted). In Borden’s view, the inability to 
disaggregate is at the heart of the partnership rules allowing partners to allocate income freely among 
themselves, seemingly in contravention of assignment of income principles:  
Partnership tax law recognizes the inability to trace partnership income from its source and 
allows partners to allocate partnership tax items in any reasonable manner. Normally any 
income from the property should be income to the property owner and income from services 
should be income to the service provider. Tax law cannot impose that rule in the partnership 
context because it cannot trace income from property and services. The allocation rules are, 
therefore, a compromise between the assignment-of-income doctrine and the inability to 
trace.  
Id. at 1302–03 (footnotes omitted).   
 184. Borden limits his claim about the inseparability of labor income and capital income to the 
context of partnership carried interest. He further limits his analysis to services partnerships in which 
tracing problems are unavoidable. Thus, for example, he believes pure investment partnerships do not 
have tracing problems and should therefore be accorded less flexibility than service-property 
partnerships. See id. at 1303. Furthermore, he explains at length that his rationale for supporting the 
current law treatment of carried interest does not extend to equity-based corporate compensation. See 
id. at 1304–10. 
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more generally whether the tax law’s distinction between labor income 
and capital income is useful, or even meaningful. As an alternative, 
analogizing to Borden, we could conceptualize capital owners and workers 
as participants in a joint venture who share in an inseparable, unitary 
return derived from their combined resources. This conception reflects the 
interdependent relationship between capital and labor in economic 
production and acknowledges the difficulty, perhaps impossibility, of 
disaggregating this collaborative return into two streams of income, one 
deriving from labor and the other, from capital.
185
  
Under a joint venture conception of workers and capital owners, the 
terms “labor income” and “capital income” would not refer to distinct, 
qualitatively different types of income, but rather would describe how 
workers and capital owners share the return derived from their 
collaboration.
186
 This would necessitate the reevaluation of the tax law’s 
preferential treatment of capital owners. With respect to the preferential 
treatment of their costs of producing income, the tax law should be 
amended to eliminate the immediate deduction for expenditures such as 
R&D and advertising, which subsidizes capital owners’ creation of 
intellectual capital.
187
 In addition, as Mary Louise Fellows and I have 
proposed, the tax treatment of workers’ and capital owners’ investments in 
human capital, such as education, should be equalized, and other of 
workers’ human capital costs, such as healthcare and childcare, should be 
recognized as valid costs of producing income.
188
 With respect to the 
preferential treatment of capital owners’ income, the tax preference for 
capital gains and dividends should be eliminated.
189
  
A joint venture conception of workers and capital owners would also 
align the tax law with efforts in other legal fields to reframe doctrinal and 
policy analysis to recognize the centrality of workers in economic 
production.
190
 Scholars in fields outside of tax have proposed a similar 
 
 
 185. This is not to say that a disaggregation scheme couldn’t be devised. Rather, my point is that 
joint venture conception leads to different policy choices. For a recent disaggregation proposal, see 
Note, Taxing Partnership Profits Interests: The Carried Interest Problem, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1773 
(2011); see also Kleinbard, supra note 5, at 49–52 (discussing the “labor-capital income centrifuge” 
for disaggregating entrepreneurial income into labor and capital components). Rather, my point is that 
joint venture conception leads to different policy choices. 
 186. The terms “income from labor” and “income from capital” are misleading because they 
imply that income can be disaggregated.  
 187. See Kahng, supra note 80, at 2274–77. 
 188. See Fellows & Kahng, supra note 140, at 391–99. 
 189. See Fleischer, supra note 160, at 41. 
 190. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283 
(1998); Marleen A. O’Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to 
Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993); Katherine Van Wezel 
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joint venture model of workers and capital owners. For example, in her 
work about how legal doctrines empower employers to control and 
appropriate returns on knowledge workers’ labor, Catherine Fisk 
suggested a new metaphor for intellectual property, which would 
conceptualize employees and employers as “joint authors” of proprietary 
knowledge, human capital, or firm intellectual property.
191
 Margaret Blair 
and Lynn Stout theorized a “team production” model of corporate 
governance that conceptualizes the public corporation as a team of 
stakeholders including shareholders, workers, creditors, and communities. 
The premise of their model is that all the stakeholders contribute to a 
product of corporate enterprise that is nonseparable and nontraceable to 
the individual team members’ contributions.192  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has endeavored to challenge the tax law’s foundational, 
yet mostly unexamined, distinction between labor and capital by focusing 
on the process by which workers and capital owners collaborate in 
economic production and the ways in which legal rules, including the tax 
law, shape their entitlements to the rewards of that collaboration. It argues 
that the labor-capital distinction is changeable and porous, and perhaps 
even illusory, and that workers and capital owners should be viewed as 
sharing in a collaborative economic product that is not separable into two 
streams of income, one attributable to labor and the other to capital. 
This revised view of the labor-capital distinction has profound 
implications for the tax law, a full exploration of which the Article leaves 
 
 
Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. 
REV. 45 (1991). 
 191. See Fisk, supra note 69, at 862–63. 
 192. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 247, 265–66 (1999). Their theory is grounded on Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz’s 
definition of team production as “production in which 1) several types of resources are used . . . 2) the 
product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all resources 
used in team production belong to one person.” Id. at 265 (quoting Armen A. Alchian & Harold 
Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 
(1972)); see also Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85, 85–105 (2011) (describing developments in 
an employee-centered theory of the firm using examples from tort law, intellectual property law, and 
tax law); Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at Work, 
13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334 (2008); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Tailored Claims and 
Governance: The Fit between Employees and Shareholders, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 121, 143–56 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999) (questioning the prevailing 
view that employees have no residual claims to corporations and finding instead that they have 
significant ownership and governance rights). 
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for future research. However, in contrast to proposals such as Piketty’s for 
a new global wealth tax, many of the specific reform prescriptions that 
flow from this Article would not require drastic changes to our tax laws. 
Rather, the problematic tax subsidies for capital owners and incongruities 
in the taxation of capital and workers identified in the Article are 
remediable within the strictures of the current law. We could reform the 
law to require capitalization of the costs of creating intellectual capital, as 
was recently proposed by the Senate Finance Committee and the House 
Ways and Means Committee.
193
 This change could even be implemented 
through an executive reversal of the INDOPCO regulations. Similarly, we 
could introduce reforms that would treat more uniformly and equitably 
capital owners’ and workers’ investments in human capital.194 Although 
these changes seem modest on their face, they would have an immediate 
and significant impact in the distribution of taxes between capital owners 
and workers. Furthermore, they would represent a major step toward 
recognizing the centrality of workers in economic productivity and 
reconceptualizing the relationship between capital owners and workers, 
not as between master and servant, but as partners.  
 
 
 193. See supra note 129 and accompanying text; Kahng, supra note 80, at 2274–77.  
 194. See Fellows & Kahng, supra note 140, at 394–99. 
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